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The Origins of Civil Rights in 
America 
G. Edward White† 
Abstract 
This Article makes three contributions. First, it represents the 
first sustained effort to identify and trace the origins of the legal 
category of civil rights in American constitutional  
jurisprudence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the category of civil 
rights did not extend back to the Declaration of  
Independence or to the framing of the Constitution. There was no 
established category of “civil rights” in eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century American law, although one can find discussion of 
the “privileges and immunities” of citizens of the United States and 
occasional mention of the term “civil rights.” The category only came 
into being with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 18661 and 
received its first judicial interpretations in the context of the 
Reconstruction-era constitutional amendments. In the decades of the 
1870s and 1880s, the category was refined, but there was never a clear 
consensus about the content or scope of civil rights, or the extent to 
which they could be enforced by the federal government. 
Second, the Article follows the work of recent scholars, such as 
William Nelson, Michael Collins, and most prominently Pamela 
Brandwein, in seeking to revise a conventional narrative about the 
constitutional history of the Reconstruction era. That narrative 
asserts that Reconstruction began as a distinctly libertarian and 
egalitarian vision, premised on the creation of new universal rights of 
citizenship and enforcement of those rights by the federal  
government. It then claims that in the years between 1866 and the 
mid-1880s, that vision was derailed and the prospective rights of 
former African American slaves in former Confederate states largely 
abandoned. It assigns some responsibility for the abandonment of the 
original goals of Reconstruction to the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the tenures of Chief Justices Salmon Chase and Morrison 
Waite, emphasizing Court majorities’ narrow readings of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities and Equal 
Protection Clauses in the Slaughter-House Cases2 and invalidation of  
† David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia School of Law. My thanks to Michael Collins, Kurt Lash, and 
George Rutherglen for their comments on earlier drafts of the article.  
1. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 
§ 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 
(2012)). 
2. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
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the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 18753 
in the Civil Rights Cases.4  
Finally, the Article has implications for a longstanding debate 
about the “original understandings” of framers of the  
Reconstruction Amendments, in particular whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment was originally understood as “incorporating” some of the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states. The Article finds 
that the Court’s Reconstruction-era civil rights jurisprudence was 
primarily driven by a concern that too-broad readings of the power of 
the federal government to enforce new civil rights would radically  
disturb the existing balance of state and federal powers. That 
concern, the Article suggests, emanated from an assumption on the 
part of the justices that the Privileges and Immunities and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were capable of 
being read as robust definitions of the privileges and immunities of 
national citizenship and of a right to equal treatment under the law, 
both of which could be enforced by the federal courts. Precisely 
because of this assumption, Chase and Waite Court majorities sought 
to define the meaning of “privileges or immunities”5 and “equal 
protection of the laws”6 narrowly. 
The Article concludes by maintaining that a proper understanding 
of the category of “civil rights” at its origin needs to take into 
account the fact that both the conceptualization and interpretation of 
the category were driven by established antebellum understandings 
about “rights” and federalism. The result was that instead of initially 
expansive definitions of new national civil rights being narrowed in 
the 1870s and 1880s, the category remained fluid and uncertain.  
 
3. 18 Stat. 335. 
4. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
5.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
6.   U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
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Introduction 
We tend to think of “civil rights” as a ubiquitous category, 
encompassing a variety of freedoms and entitlements associated with 
being an American. We also tend to think of the heritage of civil 
rights as extending back to the Declaration of Independence, the 
framing of the Constitution, and the Magna Carta and ancient rights 
of English subjects. But in fact, civil rights, as a legal category, was 
imperfectly understood in the United States before the Civil War. It 
was only after three decades of legislation, court decisions, and 
commentary before the boundaries of the category were  
established. 
This Article reviews that process. Sections II and III recover the 
dominant understandings about legal “rights” in antebellum American 
jurisprudence and the possible effect of the Civil Rights Act of 18667 
and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments on those 
 
7. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 
§ 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 
(2012)). 
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understandings. Those inquiries reveal that when the three 
Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were enacted between 
1865 and 1870, there was no widespread consensus about the content 
of “civil rights,” nor about which institutions of government were to 
enforce those rights. The category of “civil rights,” by which was 
meant rights that attached to all American citizens, was itself new: 
“rights” had not been understood in so universal a fashion before the 
Civil War. Thus the enactments collectively raised the possibility that 
a spate of new rights, associated with state and United States 
citizenship, had been created, and that the federal government could 
enforce them against states. 
That possibility served as background to three decades of judicial 
decisions and legislative commentary in which the legal category of 
“civil rights” was refined. Section IV of the Article, building on the 
work of Pamela Brandwein and others, describes the manner in which 
the category took shape. The category had two dimensions, one 
connected to its content and the other to its implications for the 
American system of federalism. Distinctions such as those between 
“secured” and “created” rights, and between “civil” and “social” 
rights, were designed to place types of conduct within or outside the 
category. They also were designed to signal which sorts of rights could 
be enforced against the states by the federal government and which 
sorts remained in the province of the states. 
With those distinctions and their federalism implications in place, 
the Article reconsiders the leading Court decisions in the conventional 
narrative of Reconstruction, the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil 
Rights Cases. That reconsideration engenders a narrative of the 
constitutional history of the Reconstruction era that differs from the 
one currently in place. 
The narrative has three central features. First, in what has 
become the conventional historiographical narrative of the 
constitutional history of Reconstruction, the Reconstruction 
Congresses have been described as treating the Union’s eradication of 
slavery and opening up of “free” western territory as mandates for a 
new egalitarian and libertarian vision of postbellum American society. 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, under the tenure of Chief Justice 
Morrison Waite, has been characterized as reluctant to embrace that 
vision. The Waite Court’s agenda, according to the narrative, was 
fostering reunion between the North and South at the expense of 
newly freed African Americans, and the Court’s posture has been seen 
as fatal to the promise of Reconstruction.8 
 
8. The most influential illustration of that narrative, Eric Foner’s 
Reconstruction, called the Reconstruction era “America’s Unfinished 
Revolution” and announced that one of the major themes of his account 
was “the emergence during the Civil War and Reconstruction of a 
national state possessing vastly expanded authority and a new set of 
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Building on recent scholarship that identified problems with the 
conventional narrative, this Article concludes that the narrative is 
anachronistic and in need of refinement. The Court’s interpretations 
of Reconstruction-era civil rights enactments were not incompatible 
with the protection of the rights of African Americans in certain 
contexts. But they rested on doctrinal distinctions that have become 
obscured with time.9   
purposes, including an unprecedented commitment to the ideal of a 
national citizenship whose equal rights belonged to all Americans 
regardless of race.” Both that ideal and the accompanying authority of 
the federal government to enforce it were casualties, Foner maintained, 
of the compromise of 1877, which “marked a decisive retreat from the 
idea . . . of a powerful national state protecting the fundamental rights 
of American citizens.” The ideals of Reconstruction were further 
undermined, Foner argued, by the Supreme Court, which “during the 
1870s . . . retreated from an expansive definition of federal power, and 
moved a long way toward emasculating the postwar amendments,” and 
in the 1880s “declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional” 
and used its “expanded jurisdiction born of Reconstruction” to “protect 
corporations from local regulation” rather than protecting African 
Americans from discrimination. Foner, Reconstruction, xxvi, 529, 
582, 586–87 (1988). In a recent lecture at Marquette University Law 
School, Foner reaffirmed this view, saying, “Reconstruction was a time 
of remarkable experiment in democracy, but of course it was short-lived, 
and there followed a long period where the rights protected by the 
[Reconstruction-era] constitutional amendments were flagrantly violated 
in the South and indeed much of the rest of the nation. One part of this 
long process of retreat from the egalitarian impulse of Reconstruction 
was a sharp narrowing of the rights that came along with being an 
American citizen. In this, the Supreme Court led the way.” Eric Foner, 
The Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Origins of Birthright 
Citizenship, Marquette Lawyer, Summer 2013 at 41–42 [hereinafter 
Foner, The Civil War]. 
9. Work by legal scholars contemporaneous with and following Foner’s 
book advanced readings of Supreme Court and lower federal court 
decisions that suggested that Foner’s characterization of the response of 
the federal judiciary to Reconstruction Amendments and legislation was 
oversimplified. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of 
Judicial Interpretation 1–6 (1985); William E. Nelson, The 
Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial 
Decision 194–96 (1988); Michael G. Collins, Justice Bradley’s Civil 
Rights Odyssey Revisited, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 1979 (1996). More recently 
Pamela Brandwein has set forth a major reinterpretation of what she 
calls the “judicial settlement of Reconstruction,” emphasizing, among 
other things, the anachronistic assumptions of the conventional 
narrative. See Pamela Brandwein, A Judicial Abandonment of Blacks? 
Rethinking the “State Action” Cases of the Waite Court, 41 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 343, 380 (2007); Pamela Brandwein, Rethinking the 
Judicial Settlement of Reconstruction (2011) [hereinafter 
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction]. My subsequent narrative 
of the Reconstruction-era history of the category of civil rights should be 
understood as informed, in some places, by that work, and in other 
places addressing issues outside its scope. Instances in which I have 
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After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,10 judicial 
decisions in the 1870s and 1880s distinguished between two different 
classes of rights, so-called “secured” or “natural” rights and so-called 
“created” or “conferred” rights.11 The former class included rights that 
in antebellum jurisprudence were thought to be among the “privileges 
and immunities” of state citizens. Those rights were creatures of state 
law, meaning they could be restricted by states and were reserved 
only for citizens, which did not include all residents of states. The 
latter class consisted of rights that had been granted to citizens by 
provisions of the Constitution.12 Brandwein’s analysis of Supreme 
Court and lower federal court decisions in voting rights cases has 
shown that the most conspicuous example of that class was the right 
afforded to black as well as white people, who were citizens of both 
the states and the United States after the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not to have their opportunities to vote restricted on the 
basis of race. 
The federalism implications of those two classes of civil rights 
were different. With respect to the first class, the federal government 
could not intervene to protect “secured” rights under its Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers unless a state had intentionally or 
negligently failed to safeguard them. This meant that in many cases 
individual infringements of civil rights in the states remained 
unprotected. With respect to “created” or “conferred” rights, however, 
the enforcement powers of the federal government were available to 
protect against civil rights violations, whether by states or 
individuals.13 
Because some provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment appeared 
to be conferring new rights on citizens or persons, it was necessary for 
courts to consider whether rights contained in the Privileges or 
Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses were 
 
relied directly on the findings or interpretations of other scholars are 
identified in the notes that follow.  
10. 14 Stat. 27. 
11.  See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96 (1873) 
(Field, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause “refers to the natural and inalienable rights which 
belong to all citizens,” as opposed to new privileges “confer[red]” upon 
citizens by the Amendment). 
12. Both Collins, supra note 9, at 1990–98, and Brandwein, Rethinking 
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 11–17 (recognizing that the 
distinction between “secured” and “created or conferred” rights was 
crucial to Justice Joseph Bradley and his contemporaries, although 
Collins uses different language to describe the distinction). 
13. Both Collins, supra note 9, at 1993–95, and Brandwein, Rethinking 
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 11–14, recognize the federalism 
implications of the distinction between “secured” and “conferred” rights.  
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understood as being enforced against the states by the federal 
government. Over a course of decisions that included both the 
Slaughter-House Cases14 and the Civil Rights Cases,15 the Supreme 
Court answered that question in the affirmative but at the same time 
read the rights conferred by those provisions narrowly.16 Thus, on the 
whole, the antebellum balance between state and federal powers was 
retained after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments. The 
Court primarily anticipated federal supervision of state or private 
activity in the area of voting rights. That approach, however, was not 
a judicial “retreat” from the anticipated goals of Reconstruction;17 it 
reflected mainstream late nineteenth-century understandings of the 
category of “civil rights” and of the interactions between the states 
and the federal government. Both the Slaughter-House Cases and the 
Civil Rights Cases need to be situated within those understandings, 
rather than being seen primarily as cases in which Court majorities 
rejected broad interpretations of the civil rights of American citizens. 
Finally, the article has implications for a debate about the 
“original understandings” of the framers of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. It suggests that the Court’s “narrow” interpretations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities and Equal 
Protection Clauses in the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights 
Cases were driven by an assumption that the Amendment could be 
read as anticipating a robust definition of the privileges or immunities 
of national citizenship, and of a right to equal treatment before the 
law that extended to all persons, both of which could be enforced by 
the federal courts. It was precisely because of this assumption that the 
Court advanced minimalist interpretations of both the Privileges or 
Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses. Broader interpretations, 
Supreme Court majorities feared, would radically upset the balance 
between state and federal powers that they had inherited from 
antebellum jurisprudence. 
This Article thus seeks to dislodge two established propositions 
about nineteenth-century constitutional history and to intervene in a 
longstanding interpretative debate. It attempts to undermine the 
 
14. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
15. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
16. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873) 
(holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not alter the 
police powers of the state, but instead affected only the rights of citizens 
of the United States, as opposed to citizens of the particular state); The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause did not affect the private choices of individuals to 
exclude black persons from business establishments). 
17. See Foner, The Civil War, supra note 8, at 41 (referring to those Court 
opinions as a “retreat” and a judicial “narrowing of . . . rights”). 
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assumption that there was a received understanding of the category of 
“civil rights,” which formed a background to the passage of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. There was no such understanding; “civil rights” 
was a novel and fluid category, spending the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century in a process of evolution. 
In aligning itself with and elaborating upon the revisionist work of 
other scholars, the article also seeks to modify the conventional view 
that the Supreme Court, in the 1870s and 1880s, fashioned inter-
pretations of Reconstruction-era amendments and legislation which 
were designed to narrow the scope of judicially protected civil rights 
in order to undermine the libertarian and egalitarian goals of 
Reconstruction. The Court did fashion narrow interpretations in some 
cases, but not in all cases. While seeking to preserve antebellum 
models of federalism, it acknowledged that in some instances 
Reconstruction-era Amendments had conferred new civil rights on all 
American citizens, and the federal judiciary was required to protect 
those rights against efforts to curtail them by states or private 
individuals. 
Finally, the article suggests that the focus of twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century scholars on whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
“incorporates” provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states has 
rested on an anachronistic reading of the Amendment. That reading is 
understandable, since the Court itself has used the language of 
incorporation in treating some Bill of Rights provisions as part of the 
“due process” requirements imposed on states by the Amendment.18 
But it departs from the way in which contemporaries viewed the 
Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  
Although contemporaries of those enactments differed on the 
content of their central provisions, they viewed them holistically, as 
charters for the new rights and privileges of citizens of the United 
States that were potentially to be enforced against the states by the  
18. An abiding difficulty, in seeking to recover the original understanding of 
the framers of constitutional provisions, is separating the language of 
those provisions from subsequent judicial interpretations of them. When 
one examines the comments of contemporaries at the time of the 
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, one is unable to find any 
mention of Bill of Rights provisions being “incorporated” against the 
states by that Amendment’s passage. Nonetheless, as we will see in more 
detail, some Reconstruction-era members of Congress, and judges, 
assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause was designed to create a new set of national civil rights, which 
included not only rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights but also 
traditional civil rights that had been hitherto thought as being directed 
only at states. The idea of rights held against the federal government as 
being “incorporated” against the states by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not surface until Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  
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federal government. Since both the idea that all citizens of states were 
now also citizens of the United States, and the corresponding idea 
that citizens of the United States had “privileges or immunities” and 
“libert[ies]” that states were now constitutionally bound to recognize, 
were departures from antebellum constitutional jurisprudence, the 
critical question for contemporary interpreters of the Reconstruction-
era enactments was how much they would disturb the existing 
balance of federal and state powers. That question turned on what 
new national “civil rights,” which states were now bound to protect, 
were contained in the enactments.  
This Article’s focus is on the evolution of judicial doctrine, not on 
the social or political context of the Waite Court’s decisions. It 
therefore does not overlap with some of the emphasis of the 
conventional historiography of Reconstruction, insofar as that 
emphasis is drawn from analyses of late nineteenth-century political, 
social, and economic developments. But the article does confront an 
image of the Chase and Waite Courts that appears in that literature. 
One might ask where that image comes from, especially since it does 
not rest on any detailed analysis of those Courts’ work. 
The image is a product of an interpretation of the work of judges 
advanced by many historians and political scientists. That 
interpretation is grounded on the outcomes reached by influential 
judges, such as Supreme Court justices, in visible cases, such as those 
that involve interpretations of the Constitution. Those outcomes are 
treated as political statements comparable to the legislative decisions 
of Congress or Presidential orders. The outcomes are given political 
labels, such as “liberal” or “conservative,” and sometimes partisan 
labels as well, such as “Republican” or “Democratic.” The analysis 
presupposes that judges are self-conscious political actors who often 
have partisan agendas, and the outcomes they reach in cases reflect 
those agendas. Part of the conclusion that the Court helped 
“abandon” the libertarian and egalitarian goals of Reconstruction 
flows from the assumption that the Court’s justices, as post–Civil 
War political actors, were unsympathetic to those goals.19 
This Article assumes that conceiving of judicial decisions as 
political statements, and interpreting them in terms of their 
outcomes, results in an incomplete understanding of the nature of 
 
19. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 25–26, 
states the following: “During the Progressive and New Deal eras . . . 
materialist histories of post–Civil War America were written which cast 
the postwar Court as the tool of big business. . . . In general, these 
materialist histories projected the political and economic developments 
of the 1890s backward onto the postwar years.” While I do not disagree 
with that comment, my explanation for the anachronistic character of 
the conventional narrative emphasizes perceptions about the nature of 
law and judging. 
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judicial decision making. In the view of this Article, the primary task 
of judges is the interpretation of purportedly authoritative legal 
sources, and those interpretations are primarily constrained not by 
the political context of judicial decisions but by the received doctrinal 
frameworks in which those decisions are set. Those doctrinal 
frameworks invariably bring with them existing legal categories and 
interpretive “understandings,” which are necessarily the product of 
previous generations. Those preexisting doctrinal frameworks, and the 
understandings that help drive them, significantly constrain judicial 
decision making by limiting the scope of “authoritative” legal 
justifications on which judges can ground their decisions. 
When the enactment of new authoritative legal sources, such as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the Reconstruction-era constitutional 
amendments, requires judges to interpret those sources, pressure is 
implicitly placed on the interpreters to integrate the sources into 
existing doctrinal frameworks. Sometimes terminology employed in 
the new sources is sufficiently open-ended as to invite judges to 
supply it with content in the course of their interpretations; the 
Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment provide illustrations. It is in the 
process of seeking determinate meaning for open-ended terms that 
received doctrinal frameworks and understandings come into play.  
When justices confronted cases that required them to give content 
to the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” or 
“liberties” within the Due Process Clause, or the “Equal Protection of 
the Laws,” they did so with an awareness of what those terms had 
meant in antebellum jurisprudence, as well as an awareness of the 
relationship between the powers of the states and those of the federal 
government in the antebellum decades. They recognized that they 
were being asked to determine how far antebellum doctrines and 
understandings had been displaced by new Reconstruction-era 
authoritative sources. 
If one assumes that justices approached the interpretation of the 
new sources with that posture, it should be no surprise that two 
concerns should have animated their interpretations. One concern was 
whether the scope of the new “privileges” or “immunities” or 
“liberties” conferred on individuals by the Reconstruction-era 
enactments was intended to extend beyond the area of race relations. 
The other was whether any new “civil rights” conferred on individuals 
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, or any of the Reconstruction 
amendments, were to be enforced against states by the federal 
government, thereby potentially transforming the laws of the states. 
In addressing those concerns across a range of cases between the early 
1870s and the mid-1880s, Court majorities concluded that the new 
authoritative sources were not designed to have a fully transformative 
effect. Their impact was to be limited to violations of “civil rights” 
with a racial animus, and their effect on traditional understandings of 
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the relationship between federal and state powers was to be negligible. 
The method by which the justices reached those conclusions was to 
fashion new doctrinal distinctions within the traditional framework of 
antebellum constitutional jurisprudence. Thus, to understand the 
constitutional history of Reconstruction, it will be necessary to start 
with antebellum conceptions and understandings of “civil rights” and 
of federalism. 
I. The Antebellum Legacy of “Rights”  
A. Corfield v. Coryell 
In 1823 Supreme Court Justice Bushrod Washington, in his 
capacity as a circuit judge for the third federal circuit, decided the 
case Corfield v. Coryell.20 The plaintiff in Corfield was a citizen of 
Pennsylvania whose ship was used to harvest oysters in the state of 
New Jersey. A New Jersey statute forbade non-residents from taking 
shellfish from state waters. It was under this statute that Corfield’s 
vessel was seized, condemned, and sold. He sued in federal court for 
trespass, arguing, among other things, that the New Jersey statute 
was in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 of the Constitution, which states that “the citizens of each 
state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the 
citizens of the several states.” 
Washington responded to this argument by attempting to 
ascertain “the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states.”21 He began that task by asserting that the terms would be 
“confin[ed] . . . to those privileges and immunities which are in their 
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free 
governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time 
of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.”22 
By characterizing privileges and immunities as “fundamental,” 
Washington was seeking to identify the privileges and immunities 
that citizens brought with them, so to speak, when they became 
members of free, republican governments. The privileges appeared to 
be a species of “natural rights,” held, against the powers of the state, 
by those who agreed to participate in the formation of republics. Since 
the United States had been a republic since its creation, the privileges 
and immunities of all its citizens had been “enjoyed” by them “at all 
times . . . from the time of [the American states] becoming free, 
independent, and sovereign.”23  
20. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
21. Id. at 551. 
22. Id.  
23. Id. 
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Because the privileges and immunities of citizens of all the 
American states were “in their nature, fundamental,” Washington did 
not think it would be “difficult,” though perhaps “tedious,” to identify 
them.24 He gave a list, adding that there were “many others which 
might be mentioned.”25 The list included 
[T]he enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire 
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain 
happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as 
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to 
reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, 
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the 
writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any 
kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of 
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher 
taxes and impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the 
state . . . .26 
To those Washington added “the elective franchise,” which he 
acknowledged could be “regulated and established by the laws or 
constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised.”27 He also 
suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “was manifestly 
calculated,” in the words of the preamble of the Articles of 
Confederation, to “secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and 
intercourse among the people of the different states of the Union.”28 
One commentator has concluded that determining “[w]hich rights 
met [the] threshold” of being “fundamental” was “more obscured than 
clarified” by Washington’s analysis,29 and two others have suggested 
that “judicial interpretation of the [Privileges and Immunities Clause] 
got off to a bad start” with Corfield.30 But if one takes Washington’s 
effort to catalog “fundamental” privileges and immunities as a 
snapshot of early nineteenth-century jurisprudential thinking about 
the nature and sources of foundational legal rights, it has some 
illuminating features.  
24. Id.  
25. Id. at 552. 
26. Id. at 551–52. 
27. Id. at 552. 
28. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
29. George Rutherglen, Civil Rights in the Shadow of 
Slavery 25 (2013). 
30. Brainerd Currie & Herma Hill Kay, Unconstitutional 
Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws; Privileges and Immunities, in 
Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 
460–61 (1963). 
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First, it is clear from Washington’s analysis that most of the 
“fundamental” privileges and immunities he cataloged did not 
originate in the text of the Constitution. He described them as 
“hav[ing], at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several 
states which compose this Union, from the time of their being free, 
independent, and sovereign.”31 That “time” began with the issuance of 
the Declaration of Independence, eleven years before the Constitution 
was drafted. Moreover, only one of the privileges Washington listed 
was embodied in a provision of the Constitution, that of the writ of 
habeas corpus. The others—enjoying life, liberty, happiness, and 
safety, acquiring, possessing, and disposing of property, bringing legal 
actions in the courts of a state, residing in or traveling through a 
state, and being free from the burdens of unequal taxation—appear to 
be something like the “inalienable rights” referred to in the 
Declaration of Independence, privileges and immunities inherent in 
the status of being a citizen of a free republican government. 
Second, Washington’s analysis suggested that the purpose of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was to “secure and perpetuate 
mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different 
states of the Union.”32 The clause appears in the same article of the 
Constitution that contains the Full Faith and Credit Clause,33 
requiring states to enforce the legal judgments of other states;34 a 
clause compelling states to “deliver up” persons charged35 with 
treason, felony, or other crimes to the states where they had been 
charged; and the Fugitive Slave Clause,36 which provided that when 
slaves escaped into other states they were to be returned by the 
authorities of those states to their masters.37 In this context, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause appears to have been an effort to 
prevent states from provoking other states by interfering with the 
policies of those states or the exercise of certain classes of rights held 
by nonresident citizens. 
Finally, Washington’s analysis in Corfield suggested that the 
category of “fundamental” privileges and immunities was a limited 
one. It did not extend, for example, to the free enjoyment of the 
fishing beds of a state by noncitizens. States could conclude, as part 
of their power to promote “the general good” of their residents, that 
the supply of fish within their boundaries might be exhausted if  
31. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
32. Id. at 552 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
36. Id. at art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
37. Id. 
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nonresidents were given unlimited access to state waters.38 Even 
though the right to harvest oysters might seem to be an example of 
the right to acquire property that Washington had identified as 
“fundamental,” it could be limited to in-state residents. This 
suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not going to 
cut very deeply into the power of states to treat their residents more 
favorably than nonresidents. 
Washington’s opinion in Corfield cited no authorities in support 
of his categorization of some privileges and immunities as 
fundamental, but we have seen that his most likely basis for including 
the privileges he singled out was an intuitive sense that they 
represented inalienable rights that citizens of free republican 
governments possessed. Thus, one could use Corfield as an illustration 
of what Washington and his contemporaries believed were the 
“natural rights” of early nineteenth-century Americans. There was, 
however, another feature of Washington’s language in Corfield, and of 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause itself: the “privileges and 
immunities” protected were reserved for citizens. The clause referred 
to the “Citizens of each State,” and to “Citizens in the several 
States.”39 
Other legal categories for describing persons existed in early 
nineteenth-century American jurisprudence. The category of “alien” 
described persons who were not citizens because they owed allegiance 
to foreign powers. The category of “denizen” was less precise: it 
referred to noncitizen residents of a particular area who might or 
might not be aliens. An example was “Indians not taxed,” a category 
mentioned in Article I of the Constitution. That category captured 
the ambiguous status of Native American tribes at the time of the 
Constitution’s framing. It was assumed that some tribal members 
owed allegiance to their tribes rather than the United States, but 
tribes were not regarded as “foreign nations,” so tribal members could 
not be aliens.40 On the other hand, only those tribal members who 
had become fully integrated into settler communities were considered 
“citizens,” and some of those members voted, held property, and paid 
taxes. Hence the term “Indians not taxed” referred to members of 
tribes who were not considered citizens.41 
The categories described above revealed that a number of 
residents of the United States in the early nineteenth century were 
not regarded as citizens and that the inalienable privileges 
 
38. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552–54. 
39. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
40. Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizen-
ship in U.S. History 144–45 (1997). 
41. Smith, supra note 40 at 144–45. 
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Washington listed in Corfield were reserved for persons with 
citizenship status. The conferral of “citizenship” of this sort was 
understood as being within the province of states from independence 
through the Civil War, and it was clear that numerous residents of 
America, the most conspicuous being the majority of African 
Americans and Native Americans, were not treated as citizens.42 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, citizenship 
status was not explicitly conferred by statute. Instead, citizenship was 
implicitly conferred by laws and practices limiting the number of 
persons who could exercise Washington’s list of privileges.43 In most 
states only white male freeholders could vote. In many, married 
women could not own property independent of their husbands. Slaves 
were not permitted to own or acquire property, to travel freely, or to 
vote, and their ability to bring actions in court was limited. Native 
Americans were rarely permitted to vote. Only a handful of states 
permitted free blacks to vote, and in Southern states they were not 
permitted to travel freely.44 
B. Luther v. Borden 
In addition to governing the decision in Corfield, antebellum 
understandings of the nature and scope of “rights” can be seen in an 
argument before the Supreme Court in the 1849 case Luther v. 
Borden,45 in which the Court concluded that it could not decide, 
under the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution,46 a controversy about 
 
42. For an extended discussion of the limitations on the definition of citizen 
in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, including free 
African Americans, Native Americans, and women, see id. at 165–96. 
Citizenship in the sense of being regarded as a person who possessed 
inalienable privileges and immunities was distinguishable from 
naturalized citizenship. The latter term was reserved for former aliens 
who chose to transfer their allegiance to the United States. The framers 
of the Constitution, mindful of the quite different standards states had 
applied in considering whether to naturalize aliens, reserved the power 
“to establish a uniform rule of naturalization” in Congress. U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Thus it was possible for a person to be a naturalized 
citizen of the United States but not a full “citizen” of a state in the 
sense of being able to exercise all the privileges associated with 
citizenship. 
43. See Gardner v. Ward, 2 Mass. (2 Will.) 244, 244 (1805) (stating that 
the determination of “what were the rights of Mr. G., or in what state 
he must be considered in law” would not be “affected by any . . . 
legislative act . . . [but rather] by the principles of the common 
law. . . .”). 
44. For more detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 21–23.  
45. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
46. U.S. Const. art IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall 
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which of two competing governments was the legitimate government 
of Rhode Island.47 
One argument invoked by supporters of the displaced government 
maintained that “every male inhabitant over twenty-one years of age” 
in Rhode Island “[had] a natural right to vote.”48 In response, John 
Whipple, representing the defendant in the case, took the occasion to 
review “classes of rights” in American jurisprudence. Whipple 
identified three classes: “natural, such as those recognized in the 
Declaration of Independence; civil, such as the rights of property; and 
political rights.”49 He then went on to say that 
Society has nothing to do with natural rights except to protect 
them. . . . Every one has the right to acquire property, and even 
in infants the laws of all governments preserve this. But 
political rights are matters of practical utility. A right to vote 
comes under this class. If it was a natural right, it would 
appertain to every human being, females and minors. . . . But 
. . . the State has the power to affix any limit . . . to the 
enjoyment of this right . . . . It can confine the right of voting 
to freeholders . . .50 
Whipple did not clearly distinguish between “natural” and “civil” 
rights, although his understanding of the latter category appeared to 
be similar to that of Washington in Corfield. But he obviously 
regarded “political” rights as those conferred by government rather 
than inherent in citizenship. Under this interpretation, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s broadening of the category of citizens to include “all 
persons” meant that a larger number of residents of a state would 
possess “civil rights,” but the state could still place restrictions on the 
right to vote. At the close of the Civil War, most states continued to 
limit the franchise to male freeholders. 
Thus by the time that the 39th Congress, controlled by 
representatives from the Union states, considered drafting the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, there was no consensus on what the “civil rights” of Americans 
were, or to whom those rights extended.51 The legacy of the late  
protect them against Invasion, and on Application of the Legislature . . . 
against domestic violence.”). 
47. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 1. 
48. Id. at 28. 
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 28–29. 
51. Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 53–54, notes that the 1856 edition of 
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, at the time a standard source for the 
definition of legal terms, had no entry for “civil rights.” Editions 
published after 1866 added an entry that defined “civil rights” as 
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eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while affirming the 
theoretical proposition that citizens of free republican governments 
enjoyed some inalienable privileges and immunities, had mainly been 
a restrictive one, emphasizing the extent to which states could limit 
the exercise of those privileges. 
II. The Thirty-Ninth Congress and “Civil Rights” 
The question that galvanized the 39th Congress into action 
on the issue of “civil rights” was the prospective eradication of 
African American slavery and what had come to be called its “badges 
and incidents.”52 The Supreme Court’s 1857 decision in Dred 
Scott53 had concluded that Congress had no power to abolish 
slavery in federal territories and that African Americans were not 
“citizens” for the purpose of being able to bring actions in the federal 
courts.54 If there had been any ambiguity about the connection 
between citizenship status and the exercise of fundamental 
privileges and immunities after Corfield, Dred Scott resolved it: 
African Americans did not have the right to sue in the federal 
courts because they were not citizens. 
A. The Thirteenth Amendment 
There were thus two potential issues in Dred Scott in which the 
39th Congress could intervene. One was the status of slavery in the 
United States; the other was the citizenship status of African 
Americans after emancipation. The Thirteenth Amendment explicitly 
addressed the former of those issues and implicitly addressed the 
latter. The Amendment’s first section declared that “[n]either slavery 
nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction.”55 This meant that slavery was 
abolished in all states and remaining federal territories and that its 
abolition reached private action. The language of the section was 
modeled on Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, which abolished 
slavery in that territory and had been understood to apply to the 
conduct of private parties. 
 
“certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by the 13th and 
14th amendments to the constitution, and by various acts of congress 
made in pursuance thereof.”  
52. The first use of that term came in debates over the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866. See Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 66–67. It is not clear 
exactly what members of the 39th Congress meant by “badges and 
incidents” of slavery.  
53. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
54. Id. at 427. 
55. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. 
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The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment stated, 
“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”56 Since no legislation was needed to emancipate former 
slaves after the Amendment’s passage, that section was designed to 
allow Congress to prescribe rules for the treatment of emancipated 
African Americans, including the potential categorization of them as 
citizens of states or of the United States. It was this feature of the 
Amendment that caused its opponents to claim that it amounted to a 
radical disruption of the existing balance between state and federal 
power. They were concerned that enforcement legislation directed at 
the status of free blacks in states with large African American 
populations would constitute a usurpation by the federal government 
of the traditional powers of states to pass laws affecting the lives of 
their residents.57 
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 
When the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is unraveled, it 
becomes clear that the drafters of that legislation intended to do 
exactly what opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment had feared: use 
the enforcement powers of Congress to alter the treatment of 
emancipated African Americans in former slave states. Section 1 of 
the Act provided: 
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to 
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby 
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of 
every race and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United 
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and 
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey 
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as 
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding.58 
Of particular interest are two dimensions of the Act’s coverage: the 
“civil rights” it enumerated, especially when compared with 
Washington’s list of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in 
Corfield; and its governing theory of the relationship of federal and  
56. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2. 
57. Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 38.  
58. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
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state institutions in enforcing the Act’s provisions. The passage of the 
Act left both of those dimensions in an unsettled state. 
The Act employed the familiar antebellum categories for 
describing persons. It identified the possession of civil rights with the 
status of citizenship and defined citizens as all persons, regardless of 
race and color, who were born in the United States and not aliens 
(those “subject to any foreign power”) or “Indians not taxed.” Its 
understanding of who was a citizen was thus the antebellum 
understanding, with one conspicuous difference: all nonwhite, native-
born Americans (save “Indians not taxed”) were given citizenship 
status. This meant that any state law or practice explicitly or 
implicitly denying citizenship to free blacks was contrary to  
the Act. 
In keeping with antebellum understandings, the civil rights listed 
in the Act were accorded to citizens. Those rights were facially 
narrower than the privileges and immunities listed by Washington in 
Corfield. They included making and enforcing contracts, bringing 
actions in court, holding, acquiring, and conveying property. As in 
Corfield, citizens were entitled to the benefit of laws protecting the 
security of person and property and were governed by laws subjecting 
them to civil and criminal penalties and punishments. They did not 
include voting rights, rights to travel and to reside within a state, 
rights to equal taxes, or rights to acquire and to pursue happiness. 
They also modified Washington’s understanding of civil rights in 
Corfield in one important respect. At the time of Corfield, black 
residents of many states were not afforded the rights catalogued in 
the Act and were subjected to civil and criminal penalties that 
differed from those imposed on white residents. The Act explicitly 
changed that treatment. Black citizens, under the Act, were deemed 
“to have the same right[s]” as were “enjoyed by white citizens” in 
“every State and Territory in the United States.” This was so even if 
“any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom” was “to the 
contrary.” The obvious referents of this language were the “Black 
Codes” drafted by several Southern states late in 1865, as the Thirty-
Ninth Congress came into session.59 
Some of the black codes, notably those of South Carolina and 
Mississippi, recited rights purportedly enjoyed by black as well as 
white persons, such as holding and acquiring property, suing and 
being sued, and having the protection of civil and criminal laws. The 
codes then inserted provisions stating that those declarations of rights 
were to be modified by subsequent provisions, which discriminated 
against free blacks in numerous respects. The declarations of “civil 
rights” in the codes were used as models by the drafters of the Civil 
 
59. For illustrations of Black Codes, see Theodore Brantner Wilson, 
The Black Codes of the South 61–80 (1965). 
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Rights Act, who then made it clear that the Act overrode any black 
codes to the contrary.60 
The Act assumed that the principal mechanism for enforcing its 
provisions would be the federal courts,61 although sections of the Act 
alluded to enforcement by the military or federal marshals.62 There 
was considerable debate in Congress about what judicial enforcement 
of the Act might mean, with some opponents believing that the 
declaration of rights derived from natural law or the common law 
would give the federal courts license to work out the contours of those 
rights, thereby transforming state law.63 But in the end, the Act’s 
emphasis on the equal treatment of black and white citizens with 
respect to the civil rights inherent in citizenship appeased opponents. 
As one supporter of the Act put it, “[t]he bill does not declare who 
shall or shall not have the right to sue, give evidence, inherit, 
purchase, and sell property. These questions are left to the States to 
determine . . . .”64 
There was, however, an issue of federalism that lingered over the 
passage of the Act: what was the basis for its citizenship clause? The 
Act had extended national citizenship to “all persons in the United 
States,” excepting aliens and “Indians not taxed” and had then 
provided that all such persons had to be afforded the same rights as 
were enjoyed by white persons. It was not clear where Congress’s 
power to accomplish those goals had originated. 
One possible basis was the Naturalization Clause. Congress could 
unquestionably have passed legislation making all slaves citizens of 
the United States under this clause. That would have effectively 
ended their slave status, since slavery was incompatible with the 
privileges and immunities of national citizenship identified in Corfield. 
But Congress had passed the Thirteenth Amendment instead, 
 
60. For more detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 47–48. The last 
portion of the Act’s last sentence, “any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding,” would 
have been taken as a reference to Black Codes. Although its 
language sweeps more broadly, facially overriding “any law” or 
“custom” inconsistent with the Act, such “notwithstanding” 
clauses were conventionally employed as boilerplate in the 
early nineteenth century. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1805, ch. 41, 
§ 8, 2 Stat. 339, 342; Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 98, 5 Stat. 677; 
Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 13, 12 Stat. 597, 599. 
61. For a deeper explanation, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 79.  
62. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 5, 9, 14 Stat. 27. For more 
detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 57. 
63. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1866). 
64. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866) (Statement of Rep. 
William Lawrence of Ohio). 
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indicating that its primary goal was to abolish slavery, leaving the 
question of slave citizenship to “appropriate legislation.” 
Another potential basis for the Act was that after the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the power was simply declaratory of existing law.65 But, 
the form of the Thirteenth Amendment also undermined this 
rationale. Had that power self-evidently followed from the passage of 
the Thirteenth Amendment itself, Section 2 of the Amendment would 
not have been necessary. No language in the Amendment, however, 
addressed the equal treatment of persons, and no language addressed 
citizenship. Moreover, a large number of persons residing in the 
United States were not citizens under common law. 
So the question remained whether Section 1 of the Civil Rights 
Act, increasing the category of persons who were citizens of the 
United States and providing them equal treatment on the basis of 
race, was “appropriate” legislation. In this context, the Fourteenth 
Amendment seemed to have been designed to remove any uncertainty 
about the constitutional basis of the Act.66 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment decided to further 
broaden the category of national citizenship and to further limit the 
states’ power to restrict the rights of citizens. First, they extended the 
category of national citizens to “[a]ll persons, born or naturalized in 
the United States,”67 thereby including all Native Americans in the 
category. Next, they equated state citizenship with national 
citizenship, requiring states to treat Native Americans as citizens as 
well. Then they added two additional limitations on the power of 
states to restrict the rights of individuals. No state could “make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States,” and no state could “deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”68 
The last two clauses, by using the language “any person,” widened 
the restrictions on the conduct of states to include their treatment of 
aliens (and subsequently corporations). It was inevitable, given the 
potentially radical inroads into state sovereignty made by the 
language of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the courts would need 
to supply some meaning to terms such as “privileges or immunities” 
 
65. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois made this argument in the debates 
over the Act. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 500, 600 
(1866).  
66. For more detail, see Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 59–71, and 
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 162. 
67. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
68. Id. 
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of national citizenship, “due process of law,” and “equal protection of 
the laws,” and judicial interpretations of those terms became common 
after 1870 and have played a major part in the conventional historical 
narrative of Reconstruction. 
D. The Fifteenth Amendment 
The Fifteenth Amendment, passed in 1870, would also play a role 
in the Court’s creation of rules of civil rights enforcement. The 
Fifteenth Amendment had a distinctive phraseology, revealing how 
antebellum understandings of “rights” remained extant during the 
Reconstruction years. The Amendment’s first section provided that 
“[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.” That language did not 
mean that all American citizens were enfranchised. It meant that 
race, color, or previous enslavement could not be made the basis for 
denying voting privileges. The obvious import of the provision was to 
strike at official efforts to prevent African Americans from voting. 
What explains the peculiar wording of the section? Its language 
did not prevent states or the federal government from restricting the 
franchise, so long as restrictions were not based on race, color, or a 
previous condition of servitude. Nor did it, on its face, prevent private 
individuals from interfering with the exercise of voting rights. Instead, 
it created a new right that in the antebellum vocabulary would be 
designed a “political right”: the right not to have one’s capacity to 
vote curtailed on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.69 What were the implications, for the enforcement of civil 
rights by federal authorities, of the Amendment’s phraseology? Were 
there to be different enforcement rules for different violations? And 
what was the connection between enforcement rules and the class of 
right being violated? 
E. Modifications of the Antebellum Legacy 
Two inquiries are central to an examination of the cumulative 
impact of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, 
and of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on the status of antebellum 
understandings of “rights.” One inquiry is whether the “rights” 
successively protected by the 39th Congress’s enactments were 
 
69. As we have seen, a distinction between “civil” and “political” rights had 
existed in antebellum jurisprudence, political rights being thought of as 
those conferred or created by some positive enactment, such as a 
constitutional amendment, and civil rights being associated with 
“natural” rights. But once a political right had been created, 
Reconstruction-era judges thought it capable of evolving into the status 
of a “civil” right. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, 
supra note 9, at 163 (discussing voting rights). 
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intended to be applied against the conduct of private parties as well 
as state actors. The other is each enactment’s anticipated role for the 
states and the federal government in securing those rights. 
1. Parties 
The language of the Thirteenth Amendment suggested that its 
coverage was not limited to state action. Slavery and involuntary 
servitude was abolished throughout the United States by the federal 
government, and there was no language in Section 1 of the 
Amendment restricting the scope of that abolition. 
Section 2 of the Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce 
the Amendment by “appropriate” legislation, and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 was intended to be an example of that legislation. Its 
language defining national citizenship, listing rights associated with it, 
and declaring that all persons holding national citizenship “shall have 
the same right[s]” as white citizens was directed at states, but also at 
federal territories, and at customs as well as laws.70 One can therefore 
assume that its limitations on the restriction of the rights of national 
citizens applied to private as well as state conduct. 
But the scope of protection afforded to “civil rights” by the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the Act was not as broad as the latter’s 
language might have suggested. There was considerable debate about 
whether the formal emancipation of slaves in the Amendment 
automatically conferred upon them the civil rights of citizens and 
gave the federal government plenary power to enforce those rights.71  
70. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
71. There has been a substantial historical literature on this issue. Compare 
Robert Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to 
Enforce Constitutional Rights: A Moral Anomaly, 73 Ford. L. Rev. 
153, 154 (2004) (concluding that plenary enforcement power was 
anticipated by the Amendment), with Michael Les Benedict, 
Preserving the Constitution 3–22 (2006) (arguing that federal 
enforcement power was only triggered by the denial of rights by states).  
 In an earlier treatment of lower court cases decided between 1866 and 
1873, Kaczorowski argued that “[j]udges expressed the belief that the 
Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil Rights Act [of 1866] were 
intended to establish the primacy of national citizenship and national 
authority over the right of citizens.” Kaczorowski, supra note 9, at 5. 
The cases that Kaczorowski discussed primarily involved challenges to 
the constitutionality of the Act. He maintained that “judges uniformly 
understood that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressed a legal theory 
that assumed that Congress and the federal courts possessed primary 
authority to protect civil rights because these rights were recognized and 
secured by the United States Constitution as rights of American 
citizenship.” Id. at 7. Having described the posture of judges between 
1866 and 1873 in that fashion, Kaczorowski then argued that the Waite 
Court retreated from that posture because it was “unable to devise a 
theory for primary national civil rights authority that would have 
permitted the states to continue to fulfill functions that the Court 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
The Origins of Civil Rights in America 
778 
The issues were contested because the only obligations facially 
imposed on states and private parties by the Amendment and the Act 
were not to allow persons to be held in a condition of slavery and to 
afford all citizens of the United States the same civil rights as white 
citizens. States remained free to define state citizenship, with its 
corresponding rights, as they chose. They could limit the category of 
persons who were treated as state citizens, and accordingly restrict 
the “civil rights” of a variety of their residents. 
Until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, then, the 
federal government’s power to abolish slavery was unquestioned, and 
its power to define national citizenship and the rights associated with 
it established, but the states retained power to define state citizenship 
and thereby limit both eligibility for that status and the rights 
associated with it. Although states (and private parties) could not 
treat nonwhite national citizens differently from white national 
citizens, they could treat state residents differently in multiple ways. 
A large residuum of state power to define the “civil rights” of 
residents of states remained after the two enactments. 
The Fourteenth Amendment arguably cut into that residuum of 
state power significantly. The first clause of the Amendment’s first 
section identified “all persons born or naturalized in the United 
States” as both “citizens of the United States” and citizens of the 
states in which they resided. That language did not in itself equate 
state with national citizenship. But the Amendment’s next clause 
declared that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” 
If those “privileges or immunities” were correlative to the “rights” 
identified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, then states were not merely 
required to afford “all persons” the same privileges and immunities 
they afforded white persons, but rather they could not “abridge” any 
of them. They could not interfere with the rights of “all persons” to 
make and enforce contracts; sue or be sued; or inherit, purchase, sell, 
lease, hold, and convey property.72 
In other words, if the “privileges and immunities” of citizens of 
the United States amounted to the rights that antebellum 
 
believed were essential to the survival of American federalism.” Id. at 
183.  
 My analysis agrees with Kaczorowski’s conclusion that federalism issues 
were important for the Chase and Waite Courts. But I disagree with his 
assertion that there was a uniform understanding among state and 
federal judges that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave Congress and the 
federal courts authority to safeguard all the civil rights of American 
citizens against state interference. In my view the meaning and scope of 
“civil rights,” and their implications for federalism issues, were deeply 
contested issues in the 1870s and 1880s. 
72. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
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jurisprudence had implicitly understood as inherent in the status of 
being a citizen, states could no longer limit those rights to a 
comparatively small sector of their resident population. “All persons” 
enjoyed those rights in the form of the “privileges or immunities” of 
national citizenship, and states could not abridge them. Further, if 
states did attempt to limit those rights, the federal judiciary could 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against them. 
But the Fourteenth Amendment only forbid state actors from 
abridging the privileges or immunities of national citizenship, or 
denying persons due process of law or the equal protection of the 
laws.73 Unlike the strictures of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, those of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
extend to private action. Thus after the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the three enactments stood in a somewhat paradoxical 
relationship to one another. 
By imposing restrictions on the ability of states to restrict the 
privileges and immunities of United States citizens, or to deny persons 
due process of law or equal protection of the laws, the Fourteenth 
Amendment had refocused the emphasis of “civil rights” in the post–
Civil War years. The emphasis of the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 had been on slavery and racial 
discrimination. The civil rights protected in those enactments had 
been the right to be free from involuntary servitude and the right of 
black citizens to enjoy the same common law privileges as white 
citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment broadened the category of 
“privileges or immunities” to include rights unconnected to racial 
status. At the same time it reaffirmed that those privileges or 
immunities were being protected against the actions of states. 
Here one can see how the legacy of “rights,” as they were 
understood in antebellum jurisprudence, had invaded the 
consciousness of the framers of Reconstruction-era civil rights 
enactments. To the extent that Americans were thought of in the 
antebellum years as citizens of “free republican governments,” those 
governments were, on the whole, states.74 The list of privileges and 
immunities cataloged in Corfield and restated in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 was thought to be held against state governments. The 
supporters of the Act who responded to charges that it threatened to 
upset the balance between state and federal powers acknowledged 
that states could impose conditions on such “rights” as access to 
 
73. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added) (“No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
74. See discussion supra Part I. 
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courts, voting, and transferring property.75 It thus made sense for the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment’s framers to think of violations 
of civil rights as primarily emanating from state officials. 
2. The Federal Government as Enforcer of “Rights” 
Since the federal judiciary was expected to be the chief 
mechanism by which the constitutionality of alleged state 
abridgements of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States was to be tested, passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments assured that two issues would be in the forefront of civil 
rights litigation. One, previously discussed, was the meaning of 
“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” including 
their enumeration and scope.76 The other was what conduct on the 
part of a private party or state official could trigger the intervention 
of the federal courts to ensure that civil rights would be protected. 
Over the course of the 1870s and 1880s, the Supreme Court developed 
a set of legal doctrines to govern that intervention. 
III. The Judicial Fashioning of Enforcement 
Rules for Civil Rights Cases 
A. United States v. Cruikshank 
United States v. Cruikshank77 arose out of a massacre of between 
sixty-two and eighty-one black men in Colfax, Louisiana, by a large 
group of members of the Ku Klux Klan. The murdered men were 
prospective voters in a state gubernatorial election.78 Three Klan 
members were charged under a section of the Enforcement Act of 
187079 that made it a felony for two or more persons to conspire to 
“injure . . . any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his free 
exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to 
him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”80 
Three of the men convicted under the section challenged their 
convictions in federal court in the Fifth Circuit, where Justice Joseph 
P. Bradley was the circuit judge. Bradley took the occasion to write a 
sweeping opinion in which he sought to clarify the reach of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and their 
 
75. Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 52, 56. 
76. See supra Parts I, II. 
77. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
78. See Charles Lane, The Day Freedom Died: The Colfax 
Massacre, the Supreme Court, and the Betrayal of Recon-
struction 265–66 (2008). 
79. 16 Stat. 140. 
80. Id. at 141. 
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enforcement legislation.81 In that opinion Bradley addressed the effects 
of the amendments on each of the ambiguous legacies of antebellum 
civil rights jurisprudence: the nature of civil rights, the impact of the 
amendments on private as well as state conduct, and the implications 
of the federal government’s new enforcement powers for traditional 
understandings of federalism. Although Bradley’s opinion only 
represented the views of one circuit judge, it was widely distributed, 
and the Court subsequently cited it in cases interpreting the state 
action component of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.82 
 
81. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 
14,897). 
82. Id. Bradley’s opinion, and a March 12, 1871, letter he wrote to then-
federal judge William B. Woods, have been noted by Nelson, supra 
note 9, at 196, Collins, supra note 9, at 1985–86, 1988–1995; and 
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 12–17, 
93–112. In the letter, prompted by circuit court decisions interpreting 
enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Bradley said that “denying the equal 
protection of the laws includes the omission to protect as well as the 
omission to pass laws for protection . . . . Denying includes inaction as 
well as action.” Letter from Justice Joseph Bradley to Judge William B. 
Woods (on file with Joseph Bradley Papers, New Jersey Historical 
Society). Although each of those scholars recognized that by 1871 
Bradley had come to believe that civil rights could be infringed by 
states through “inaction” as well as “action,” they made different uses of 
that finding.  
 Nelson merely noted the affinity between Bradley’s 1871 position and 
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases. 
Nelson, supra note 9, at 195–96.  
 Collins, as part of an effort to demonstrate that Bradley’s constitutional 
jurisprudence was consistent over time, emphasized that Bradley 
distinguished between “preexisting” rights, which were only protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment when they were intentionally or 
negligently violated by states, and “newly conferred” rights, such as the 
right to be free from the condition of slavery conferred by the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the right “to vote free of racial 
discrimination” conferred by the Fifteenth Amendment. The federal 
government could protect the latter set of rights against interference by 
private as well as state actors. Collins, supra note 9, at 1990–93.  
 Brandwein fastened on the “inaction as well as action” language in 
Bradley’s letter to Woods and his distinction between preexisting and 
conferred rights to suggest that several Reconstruction-era constitutional 
decisions by the Supreme Court can be understood as pivoting on what 
she calls the concept of “state neglect” (inaction that caused the denial 
of civil rights) and the “Fifteenth Amendment exception” (the view that 
the right to vote free of racial discrimination could be protected against 
private as well as state action). Brandwein, Rethinking 
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 12–17. She maintained that “a new 
understanding of the judicial settlement of Reconstruction” emerges 
from a focus on those concepts. Id. at 17. 
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We have seen that the existing categories of antebellum rights 
jurisprudence suggested that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments, together with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
were addressing two different sorts of rights. The rights associated 
with “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” were 
natural rights, enjoyed by all citizens of free republican governments 
and held against states.83 Thus in making reference to the privileges or 
immunities of national citizenship, due process of law, or equal 
protection of the laws, the Fourteenth Amendment did not create any 
new rights. “Due process of law” was equated with the privileges and 
immunities identified in Corfield and Luther v. Borden, and “equal 
protection of the laws” was equated with the right of all citizens to 
safety, security, and like treatment before the courts.84 
In contrast, Bradley saw the Thirteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments as creating new rights. In abolishing slavery, the 
Thirteenth Amendment had, as Bradley put it in his circuit court 
opinion in Cruikshank, created “a positive right that did not exist 
before.”85 That was correct in the sense that slaves had been denied 
the right of freedom and that African Americans, but not whites, had 
been treated as eligible for slave status. But freedom and equal 
treatment before the law had been natural rights at common law. In 
contrast, the right not to have one’s vote “abridged . . . on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude” had been created by 
the Fifteenth Amendment. It was, Bradley noted, a “right . . . to be 
exempt from the disability of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude, as respects the right to vote.”86 This made it, in the 
language of antebellum civil rights jurisprudence, a “political” rather 
than a “natural” right. 
Bradley would make use of that distinction in Cruikshank, 
adopting the vocabulary of antebellum jurisprudence employed for 
different categories of rights, which referred to natural rights as 
“secured,” “declared,” or “guaranteed,” and political rights as 
 
 I agree with each of those scholars that a distinction between “secured” 
and “created” civil rights (to use terminology employed by 
contemporaries) and a recognition that a state’s infringement of civil 
rights could arise from inaction as well as action were crucial to the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the Reconstruction era. My primary 
purpose in emphasizing those features, however, is to demonstrate the 
fluidity of the category of civil rights, and the abiding concern of 
Supreme Court justices with retaining something like the antebellum 
relationship between state and federal power, in that period.  
83. See discussion supra Part I.  
84. See generally Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 74. 
85. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at  712. 
86. Id. 
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“granted, given, or conferred.” In Cruikshank, Bradley alluded to 
“every right and privilege given or guarantied [sic] by the 
constitution”87 and also to “rights and privileges” that “are secured in 
the constitution” rather than being “created or conferred by the 
constitution.”88 
The different categories of rights, Bradley believed, triggered 
different allocations of power to enforce them.89 When natural rights 
were at issue, the federal government’s enforcement power was 
contingent on a state’s denial of the rights. This was because, at 
common law, natural rights existed against state governments.90 The 
ordinary criminal laws of a state, for example, were designed to 
prevent the state from infringing the rights of citizens to life and 
liberty; only when a state infringed or failed to protect one’s rights 
could the federal government step in to enforce them. 
Created, or political, rights were different. They represented an 
effort on part of the framers of constitutional provisions to add to the 
stock of rights enjoyed by Americans. In Bradley’s view, this meant 
that it was not necessary to have a showing of willful or negligent 
state failure to enforce the rights before the federal government could 
step in to enforce them.91 Given his view that the Fifteenth 
Amendment “substantially guaranties [sic] the equal right to vote to 
citizens of every race and color,” Bradley was “inclined to the opinion 
that congress has the power to secure that right not only against the 
unfriendly operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and 
combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state 
laws.”92 
There were textual difficulties with Bradley’s position. Although 
he understood the language of the Thirteenth Amendment as being 
categorical, “a positive declaration that slavery shall not exist,”93 and 
therefore applicable to private individuals as well as states or the 
federal government, the Thirteenth Amendment only covered slavery. 
The Fifteenth Amendment’s language governed voting rights of the 
 
87. Id. at 710.  
88. Id. For more detail, see Collins, supra note 9, at 1992–94; Brandwein, 
Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 94–101. 
89. My analysis of Bradley’s Cruikshank opinion is indebted to Collins, 
supra note 9, at 1990–95; and to Brandwein, Rethinking 
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 94–101. 
90. Collins, supra note 9, at 1990–91.  See also Brandwein, Rethinking 
Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 97–98. 
91. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 95, 99; 
Collins, supra note 9, at 1991–92. 
92. 25 F. Cas. a t  7 1 3 .  
93. Id. at 711. 
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sort that the defendants in Cruikshank had disrupted, but that 
amendment contained the same state action limitations as the 
Fourteenth Amendment. How, then, could action by private parties 
to deprive black citizens of voting rights be made the basis of a 
federal offense?94 
In his circuit opinion in Cruikshank, Bradley sought to circumvent 
those difficulties by drawing upon the antebellum distinction between 
natural and political rights. Whereas the former category of rights 
was held against state governments, the latter category had been 
created by constitutional provisions. This meant, for Bradley, that the 
powers of the federal government to enforce rights “will depend on the 
character of the right . . . .”95 If the federal government were to have 
power to enforce natural rights against states, it could “pass laws for 
the general preservation of social order in every state,”96 transforming 
the traditional relations between it and the states. Thus with respect 
to natural or secured rights, the enforcement role for the federal 
government was that of an overseer, only becoming active when states 
failed, either deliberately or inadvertently, to protect those rights.97 
Since there was no language in the Thirteenth Amendment or the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 limiting violations of the designated civil 
rights to states or the federal government, Bradley acknowledged that 
the Amendment’s prohibitions could be enforced against individuals. 
But, he pointed out, the Amendment and the Act did not state that 
no institutions or individuals could violate the civil rights listed in the 
Act. They merely stated that no persons in the United States could 
be slaves and that all citizens were required to be given the same 
privileges and immunities as white citizens. Bradley read this 
language as authorizing Congress to intervene only when the civil 
rights of citizens were interfered with because of racial animus.98 “To 
constitute an offense . . . of which congress and the courts of the 
United States have a right to take cognizance under [the Thirteenth] 
amendment,” he maintained, “there must be a design to injure a 
person . . . by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude. Otherwise it is a case exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
the state and its courts.”99 
 
94. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 98–
102. 
95. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 710.  
96. Id.  
97. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 97–
98; Collins, supra note 9, at 1991. 
98. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 101–02. 
99. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 712. 
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The first step in Bradley’s analysis was thus to confine federal 
enforcement of state or private violations of civil rights to those 
violations made because of racial animus. The next step was to 
surmount, in some instances, the state action limitations of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. Here again Bradley made use of the 
antebellum distinction between natural and political rights, while 
retaining the distinguishing feature of racial animus. Because voting 
rights were conferred, political rights, the federal government could 
enforce them against usurpations by private individuals as well as 
states. It could also enforce them if states neglected to uphold them 
as well as when they deliberately withheld them. But a showing of 
racial animus was still necessary to trigger federal intervention.100 This 
enabled Bradley to dismiss all the indictments against the defendants 
in Cruikshank. All that had been shown was that the defendants 
assaulted citizens who happened to be black: that was an “ordinary 
crime,” cognizable only in the state courts. To show that the 
defendants had conspired to deprive the black citizens of their voting 
rights, it was necessary to establish a racial motive.101 
The Supreme Court subsequently ratified Bradley’s dismissal of 
the indictment in United States v. Cruikshank,102 and that decision 
has conventionally been regarded as undermining the federal 
government’s efforts to protect black citizens against usurpations of 
their rights, with one commentator asserting that Cruikshank “shaped 
the Constitution to the advantage of the Ku Klux Klan.”103 But 
although Bradley allowed the defendants in Cruikshank, who were 
very likely motivated by racial animus, to escape punishment, his 
opinion also offered three suggestions for the federal courts in their 
efforts to enforce the voting rights of blacks in the South. 
 
100. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 98–100; 
Collins, supra note 9, at 1992. 
101. The defendants in Cruikshank had been indicted under Section 6 of the 
Enforcement Act of 1870, designed to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 
That section made it a felony for two or more persons to conspire to 
“injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to 
prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or 
privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States.” 16 Stat. 140, 141. Because Bradley found that section 
“not confined to cases of [racial] discrimination,” he concluded it was 
“not supported by the constitution.” Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 715. 
102. 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
103. Leonard W. Levy, United States v. Cruikshank, in Leonard W. Levy 
et al., 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 733 (2d 
ed. 2000). 
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One suggestion has been described as the doctrine of “state 
neglect.”104 Bradley indicated that although individual violations of 
civil rights were not covered by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, if states neglected to provide citizens relief against 
deprivations of their rights, the federal government could intervene. 
Another followed from Bradley’s distinction between the 
enforcement powers of the federal government where natural and 
political rights were concerned. When a right “conferred” by the 
Constitution was being usurped by a state or an individual, he 
maintained, the federal government could enforce the right 
notwithstanding state action limitations. The Fifteenth Amendment 
was an example of conferred or political rights. In a passage in his 
Cruikshank circuit opinion, Bradley said that “[i]f in a community or 
neighborhood composed principally of whites, a citizen of African 
descent . . . should propose to lease and cultivate a farm, and a 
combination should be formed to . . . prevent him from the 
accomplishment of his purpose on account of his race or color, it 
cannot be doubted that this would be a case within the power of 
congress to remedy and redress.”105 Similarly, although the Fifteenth 
Amendment did not grant unrestricted rights to vote, it did confer a 
right not to have the opportunity to vote restricted because of race or 
color. Bradley concluded that had racial animus been shown in 
Cruikshank, the federal government could have successfully indicted 
the defendants in that case for conspiracy to deprive black citizens of 
their voting rights.106 
The third mechanism by which the federal government could 
protect the voting rights of blacks was simply alluded to by Bradley 
in his Cruikshank opinion. This was the “times, places and manner” 
clause of Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, which gave Congress 
the power to “make or alter such Regulations” as “shall be prescribed 
 
104. The term was coined by Pamela Brandwein in Brandwein, 
Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 14. It describes 
Bradley’s conclusion in his 1871 letter to Woods that the federal 
government could violate citizens’ civil rights by inaction, previously 
noted by Nelson, supra note 9, at 196, and Collins, supra note 9, at 
1985–86, 1988–95. See also Harold M. Hyman & William M. 
Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law 435–36 (1982) (hereinafter 
Equal Justice Under Law) (“[T]he federal government had both a 
right and a duty under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
reach into states in order to inhibit the actions of state officials or 
individuals intended to deprive citizens of . . . rights.”) and Robert J. 
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 919, 937 (1986) 
(noting that state infringement of civil rights could come from 
“inaction” as well as “action”). 
105. 25 F. Cas. at 712. 
106. Collins, supra note 9, at 1995. 
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in each State by the Legislature thereof” as to “[t]he Times, Places, 
and Manner of holding [federal] Elections . . . .”107 That clause 
appeared to give the federal government plenary power to protect the 
right to vote in national elections. 
Pamela Brandwein has shown that in cases decided between 1874 
and 1876, lower federal courts and the Supreme Court picked up on 
all of Bradley’s suggestions.108 In three cases involving efforts by 
individuals to harass, assault, or murder African Americans in 
connection with voting, federal judges, in charges to grand juries, 
made it clear that if racial animus was shown, federal authorities 
could punish private individuals for those actions if state authorities 
had not done so.109 Those charges retained the racial animus 
requirement for any federal intervention but also linked the concepts 
of state neglect and political rights. Ordinarily assaults, batteries, or 
murders were state crimes, but when the motivation of the defendants 
was racially based and the actions were efforts to deprive black 
citizens of Fifteenth Amendment rights, the federal government, on a 
showing of state neglect, could intervene. 
B. United States v. Reese 
In 1876, the Supreme Court reviewed Bradley’s decision in 
Cruikshank and a companion case where officials in Lexington, 
Kentucky, had refused to count the vote of an African American, also 
retaining the concept of state neglect, as well as insisting that federal 
prosecutions under the Fifteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 could only be brought if a racial motive was asserted. The 
companion case, United States v. Reese,110 has, like Cruikshank, been 
treated as evidence of the Court’s hostility to Reconstruction because 
“state action” was clearly involved and the Court dismissed the 
indictment.111 
 
107. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
108. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 108–
26. 
109. The cases were United States v. Blackburn, 24 F. Cas. 1158  (C.C.W.D. 
Mo. 1874) (No. 14,603) (Judge Arnold Krekel); Charge to Grand Jury—
Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 1005 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1875) (No. 18,260) 
(Judge Halmer Emmons); and [unnamed case from Oct. 1874], (reported 
in New York Times, Oct. 24, 1874, at p. 1 and also in Chicago 
Tribune, Oct. 24, 1874, at p. 7) (Judge Bland Ballard). 
110. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).  
111. E.g., Leonard W. Levy, Reese v. United States, in Leonard W. Levy 
et al., 5 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 2145 (2d 
ed. 2000) (“The Supreme Court crippled the attempt of the federal 
government to protect the right to vote and made constitutionally 
possible the circumvention of the Fifteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
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But Reese, like Cruikshank, was based on the Court’s 
understanding that racial animus was required where the federal 
government was seeking to penalize violations of Fifteenth 
Amendment voting rights. In Cruikshank no racial animus had been 
shown. In Reese it could be presumed because the prospective voter 
was black, but an 1874 codification of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 
on which the federal prosecution was based, had failed to include 
language prohibiting only those denials of voting made “on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”112 The sections under 
which the defendants in Reese had been indicted were thus 
unconstitutionally broad. 
Two passages in Chief Justice Morrison Waite’s opinion for the 
Court in Reese demonstrated that the Court had entertained each of 
Bradley’s suggestions for the federal enforcement of voting rights.113 
One, referring to the failure of the indictment in Reese to allege racial 
animus, stated, “It is only when the wrongful refusal at such an 
election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, 
that Congress can interfere, and provide for its punishment.”114 
Although the passage was chiefly directed toward disposing of the 
indictment, it contained all of the elements of the Court’s 
jurisprudence of federal voting rights cases in the South. The “right” 
at stake was that of not having one’s voting rights in a municipal 
election discriminated against on the basis of race, a Fifteenth 
Amendment right. Federal intervention was triggered by the 
“wrongful” refusal of access to voting. That refusal could be the result 
of the action of state officials (as in Reese) or private individuals (as 
in Cruikshank). It also could be the result of inaction on the part of 
state officials: state neglect. Neither official action nor intentional 
conduct was necessary to trigger federal intervention. 
In addition, Waite said that “[t]he effect of art. 1, sect. 4, of the 
Constitution, in respect to election for senators and representatives, is 
not now under consideration.”115 That provision would play a role in 
the Court’s subsequent voting rights cases. It was not relevant in 
Reese because that case involved a municipal election, and the article 
pertained to national elections.116 But the Clause gave Congress the 
power to make “regulations” for those elections, including the 
“manner” of holding them, and it did not require a showing of racial  
112. 92 U.S. at 218. 
113. Both passages are discussed in Brandwein, Rethinking Recon-
struction, supra note 9, at 123, 125. 
114. 92 U.S. at 218. 
115. Id.  
116. The clause provides that states may elect the times, places, and manner 
of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, but Congress may 
alter these regulations. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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animus to be enforced. So it appeared to be a basis for the positioning 
of federal officials to uphold African American voting rights in the 
South. 
Two months before the 1876 presidential election, Attorney 
General Alphonso Taft issued a circular deploying Federal Marshals 
to several Southern states to enforce “the peace of the United States” 
in federal elections. He based his authority on Article I, Section 4, and 
noted that in the Reese case the Court had indicated that it was not 
considering that provision. Reese, Taft said, “arose upon an election 
of State officers, only, and this order relates to the election of Federal 
officers, only.”117 
The above actions by the Court and the Grant administration 
demonstrate that without knowing the doctrinal setting of Court 
decisions in the years immediately following the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it 
is easy to gain a false impression of those decisions. Distinctions such 
as that between secured and created rights, or between ordinary 
crimes and the actions specially sanctioned by the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, were crucial for Justices who wanted to 
acknowledge the federal government’s power to enforce the 
Amendments’ provisions but did not want to radically disturb 
antebellum understandings of the relationship between state and 
federal powers. 
The differential treatment of violations of voting rights in state 
and federal elections captured those concerns. Where state elections 
were concerned, as in Cruikshank and Reese, the power of the federal 
government to oversee the conduct of state officials and private 
individuals was limited to actions motivated by racial animus (or by 
the disinclination of state officials to correct private actions of that 
sort). To allow the federal government to enforce voting rights 
without evidence that those rights had been restricted because of 
racial animus was to invite undue interference with state prerogatives. 
But no such concern was present in federal elections. Here, the rights 
were created rights, which extended to all voters, so the federal 
government’s supervisory power need not be limited to instances of 
racial discrimination. Stationing federal marshals in Southern states 
to regulate the process of federal elections was not an unwarranted 
extension of federal power.118 
 
117. Taft’s circular was reprinted in the New York Times, Sept. 5, 1876, at 
p.2. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 130–
39, calls attention to the circular as evidence that the Grant 
administration had picked up on Bradley’s and Waite’s suggestions 
about the role of Article I, Section 4 in voting rights cases. 
118. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 133, 
argues that “Waite had signaled [the] availability [of the Article I, 
Section 4 argument]. So had Bradley. Taft was . . . . taking [the Court’s] 
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C. Federal Voting Rights Cases, 1877–1884 
Brandwein has also shown that three cases decided between 1877 
and 1884 can be seen as illustrating the continuing vitality, in those 
years, of the doctrinal guideposts first introduced by Bradley in his 
circuit court opinion in Cruikshank.119 The first decision was a circuit 
opinion by Waite in United States v. Butler.120 In September 1876, 
members of “rifle clubs” in Aiken County, South Carolina, sought to 
intimidate African Americans from participating in forthcoming 
elections by besieging and shooting them. In a riot near the town of 
Ellenton, many African Americans were killed, and some retaliated by 
killing whites. Federal troops were dispatched to the area, and twelve 
rifle club members were arrested, including Andrew Pickens Butler, a 
former colonel in the Confederate army. 
The federal government, pursuing the lines laid out in Taft’s 
circular, brought an indictment against Butler and the others based 
on two theories. One was under Article I, Section 4; the other under 
the Fifteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act of 1870. In his 
charge to the jury, Waite followed the Cruikshank rules for federal 
enforcement of civil rights. For the three counts under Article I, 
Section 4, Waite made it clear that the federal government had a 
general power to police federal elections and that no racial animus on 
the part of those interfering with them needed to be shown. For the 
two counts under the Fifteenth Amendment, Waite concluded that 
the “controlling element” to make out a successful indictment was a 
showing that those indicted had conspired to deprive African 
Americans of the opportunity to vote on the basis of their race.121 
In the second case, Ex parte Siebold,122 the Supreme Court relied 
on Article I, Section 4 to secure the convictions of five Maryland 
election officials who stuffed ballot boxes and allowed others to be 
destroyed in a national election. They were charged under election 
 
cue.” Although Taft might have noted those “signals,” as Attorney 
General of the United States, he was in a position to pay attention to 
constitutional provisions affecting voting in federal elections.  
119. See id. at 144–51. 
120. 25 F. Cas. 213 (C.C.D.S.C. 1877) (No. 14,700). Butler had received 
comparatively little attention from scholars before Brandwein, who 
discusses it in Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 
9, at 145–47. After Waite’s charge to the jury, it deadlocked, 
presumably along racial lines, resulting in no conviction. For more 
detail, see Lou Faulkner Williams, Federal Enforcement of Black Rights 
in the Post-Redemption South: The Ellenton Riot Case, in Local 
Matters: Race, Crime, and Justice in the Nineteenth-Century 
South 172–89 (Christopher Waldrep & Donald G. Nieman eds., 2001). 
121. 25 F. Cas. at 223–24. 
122. 100 U.S. 371 (1879). 
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laws that called for the prosecution of state officials who refused to 
perform duties in national elections or interfered with the duties of 
federal officials. They sought a writ of habeas corpus after being 
imprisoned on the ground that keeping the peace was a duty reserved 
for state officials. The Court, in an opinion written by Bradley, held 
that the federal government had a power to police national elections 
and could compel state officials to assist federal officials in that task. 
The election laws sanctioning state officials for not cooperating in the 
policing of federal elections were valid implementations of the Times, 
Places, and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4.123 
The third case, Ex parte Yarbrough,124 involved another effort to 
interfere with voting by African Americans in a federal election. Five 
members of the Klu Klux Klan beat a Georgia black voter. 
Indictments were brought under the Fifteenth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 4. A unanimous Supreme Court upheld the 
indictments against arguments that state action was necessary to 
convict under the Fifteenth Amendment and that the right to vote for 
a member of Congress was governed by state law. Justice Miller 
explained the Court’s rationale: 
The reference to cases in this court in which the power of 
congress under the first section of the fourteenth amendment 
has been held to relate alone to acts done under state authority 
can afford petitioners no aid in the present case. . . . [A]cts 
which are mere invasions of private rights[ and] have no 
sanction in the statutes of a state, or . . . are not committed by 
any one exercising its authority, are [normally] not within the 
scope of that amendment, [but] it is quite a different matter 
when congress undertakes to protect the citizen in the exercise 
of rights conferred by the constitution of the United States . . . 
.125 
Violations of “secured” rights thus required state action under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, but not violations of 
“conferred” rights, and, as Miller explained, by protecting African 
Americans against discrimination in voting “whenever the right to 
vote may be granted to others,” the Fifteenth Amendment 
“substantially confer[red] on the negro the right to vote, and Congress 
has the power to protect and enforce that right.”126 Moreover, the 
right to vote for a member of Congress was not dependent on state 
law, as in the case of voting rights generally. It was “created by the 
 
123. Id. at 394–95, 399. 
124. 110 U.S. 651 (1884). 
125. Id. at 665–66. 
126. Id. at 665. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 3·2014 
The Origins of Civil Rights in America 
792 
Constitution,” and thus the federal government had plenary power to 
endorse it.127 
Brandwein’s readings of the above decisions suggest that the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence in “civil rights” cases 
had crystallized around three propositions between the early 1870s 
and the mid-1880s. First, the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
had left the antebellum category of “natural” or “secured” rights 
essentially undisturbed, and the definition of those rights continued to 
be a matter of state law. Second, however, the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, taken together, 
prohibited states, and in some instances private individuals, from 
restricting rights conferred by the Constitution, the foremost example 
of which was the right of all citizens to vote in federal elections. 
Third, some cases had suggested that the federal government had 
power to enforce the “secured” rights of individuals if states neglected 
to  
enforce them. 
The context in which those propositions had been formulated had 
typically been that of efforts on the part of African Americans to vote 
in state or federal elections. With respect to state elections, 
interference with those efforts, such as assaults on prospective African 
American voters, required racial animus, and voting in state elections 
was designated a “secured” right, one that could be restricted by state 
law. With respect to federal elections, voting rights were placed in a 
different category. They were designated “conferred” rights, 
constitutionally created civil rights whose enforcement was not 
dependent on state law or on the actions of state officials. Most 
prominent among those was the right not to have one’s opportunity 
to vote in federal elections restricted on the basis of race. The right of 
African Americans to vote in federal elections could be enforced by 
the federal government either under the Fifteenth Amendment or 
under the Times, Places, and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4. 
Finally, systematic failure on the part of state authorities to 
enforce the right of African Americans to vote in state elections could 
result in intervention by the federal government to protect that right. 
If, for example, private individuals sought to harass or intimidate 
African American voters in state elections, and state authorities took 
no action to prevent that conduct, their neglect could amount to 
sufficient “state action” to trigger the enforcement provisions of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
The endorsement of those propositions by the Supreme Court in 
the two decades following the Civil War suggests that the 
conventional view of the Court as contributing to a retreat from the 
initial goals of Reconstruction needs modification. The conventional 
 
127. Id. at 663–64. 
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view characterizes the Court as abandoning the egalitarian promise of 
Reconstruction in two respects: by allowing violent reprisals against 
African Americans in Southern states to go unpunished unless explicit 
racial animus was shown, and by declining to interpret the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as charters for new federal 
civil rights.128 
Brandwein’s analysis of voting rights cases in the 1870s and 1880s 
reveals that the conventional view is misplaced.129 First, the Court 
signaled that where state authorities had neglected to enforce the civil 
rights of individuals, federal authorities could step in to enforce those 
rights. Second, the Court distinguished between civil rights that were 
“secured” and those that had been “conferred” or “created” by the 
Constitution, and indicated that neither states nor private individuals 
could infringe on the latter set of rights. Thus in one group of cases, 
where states allegedly restricted the opportunities of blacks to sue in 
the courts, or own property, it was necessary to show an institutional 
pattern of failure to allow the enjoyment of those rights for federal 
enforcement to take place; in another, where states or private 
individuals allegedly interfered with the efforts of blacks to vote in 
federal elections, nothing but an interference needed to be shown.130 
From the perspective of federalism, the Court’s approach to civil 
rights cases did not represent the abdication of federal enforcement 
suggested by the conventional view. Although, as we will see, the 
Court treated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as only 
creating a limited number of federal civil rights, it treated the federal 
government both as an overseer of state governments with respect to 
the accommodation of “secured” civil rights and as an enforcer of 
“created” federal civil rights. In those capacities, the federal 
government could be expected to encroach into state sovereignty. 
D. “Civil Rights” and the Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases 
How might the Court’s two most prominent decisions interpreting 
Reconstruction enactments, the Slaughter-House Cases131 (1873) and 
the Civil Rights Cases132 (1883), be understood once attention has 
been drawn to the distinction between “secured” and “created” civil 
 
128. In addition to Foner, supra note 8, evidence of this view can be found 
in Equal Justice Under Law, supra note 104, at 493, and 
Kaczorowski, supra note 9, at 187. 
129. As she puts it, “The two-pronged voting rights jurisprudence elaborated 
between 1877 and 1884 rested on the Fifteenth Amendment and Article 
I, Section 4. State action limitations did not apply.” Brandwein, 
Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 144–45. 
130. Id.  
131. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
132. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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rights, to the race-based character of the “created” rights category, 
and to the overlapping treatment of intentional and negligent state 
infringements on rights? The conventional view of both decisions is 
that their majority opinions contributed to the demise of the 
egalitarian ideals of Reconstruction and encouraged the reemergence 
of white supremacist governments in former Confederate states.133 
When language in those opinions is matched up with language in 
earlier cases, however, the opinions can be seen as retaining, rather 
than transforming, the distinctive, and ambivalent, vocabulary of 
“civil rights” as the category evolved out of antebellum 
jurisprudence.134 
1. The Slaughter-House Cases 
Recent scholarship on the Slaughter-House Cases has corrected 
one historiographical stereotype: that the Louisiana legislation 
challenged in the cases, which granted an exclusive franchise to the 
Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughtering Company, 
created a monopoly and was passed by a corrupt legislature. In fact, 
the company granted the franchise was required to allow all butchers 
to use its facilities and subjected to fines if it did not do so. The 
rationale for creating an exclusive franchise was to make the business 
of slaughtering animals less of a public health hazard by ensuring that 
slaughtering would take place in one facility that could be regularly 
inspected. Although the butchers who challenged the legislation 
invoked anti-monopoly and anti-corruption rhetoric, the invocations 
 
133. See Harold M. Hyman, Slaughterhouse Cases, in Levy et al., 5 
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 2423 (2d ed. 2000) 
(“[Justice Samuel] Miller separated federal from state privileges and 
immunities. He assigned to the states the definition of ordinary 
marketplace relationships essential to the vast majority of people. More 
important, he assigned to state privileges and immunities all basic civil 
liberties and rights, excluding them from federal protection. Miller’s 
sweeping interpretation relegated everyone, including Negroes, who had 
assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment had assigned the federal 
government the role of ‘guardian democracy’ over state-defined civil 
rights, to the state governments for effective protection.”). See also 
Leonard W. Levy, Civil Rights Cases, in Levy et al., 2 Encyclopedia 
of the American Constitution 408 (2d ed. 2000) (“[The Court’s 
opinion] had the effect of reinforcing racist attitudes and practices, while 
emasculating a heroic effort by Congress and the President to prevent 
the growth of a Jim Crow society. The Court also emasculated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause, section five.”). 
134. Although the emphasis in my discussion of the Slaughter-House Cases 
and the Civil Rights Cases differs from Brandwein’s analysis, we are 
both suggesting that the typology of civil rights present in Bradley’s 
Cruikshank opinion can be seen in the opinions in both of those cases. 
See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 57–
58, 163–65. 
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were disingenuous. The butchers had a virtual monopoly of the 
slaughtering trade prior to the legislation’s passage and had 
collectively ignored health regulations and inflated the prices of meat. 
Louisiana had a tradition of legislative corruption, and support of the 
butchers’ arguments by white residents of New Orleans was more of a 
protest against the fact that the Louisiana legislature included black 
representatives than a concern about it being corrupt. Other cities 
had regulated the slaughtering trade by invoking the police power of 
states and municipalities to promote public health.135 
That same scholarship has remained wedded, however, to another 
stereotype about the Slaughter-House Cases: that Justice Samuel 
Miller’s majority opinion began the post–Civil War judicial 
abandonment of African Americans by construing the privileges or 
immunities and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment narrowly.136 If, however, one reads Miller’s opinion 
against the backdrop of antebellum conceptions of citizenship, Miller’s 
private correspondence, and the cases previously discussed, it is clear 
that although he did undertake a narrow reading of the clauses, he 
did so in part because he anticipated that an effect of the Fourteenth 
Amendment might be to impose a new set of restrictions on the 
ability of states to define the scope of “civil rights.”137 Moreover, 
Miller did not find a narrow reading of the clauses incompatible with 
judicial protection of the civil rights of black residents of southern 
states. 
The key to understanding Miller’s construction of the 
Reconstruction Amendments in the Slaughter-House Cases is to  
135. See Ronald M. Labbé & Jonathan Lurie, The Slaughterhouse 
Cases 17–102 (2003); Michael A. Ross, Justice of Shattered 
Dreams 189–99 (2003). 
136. Labbe & Lurie, supra note 135, at 211–21; Ross, supra note 135, at 
200–04. 
137. There is considerable evidence that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were concerned about the restriction of Bill of Rights 
guarantees by Southern states in the antebellum years, and thus 
anticipated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be interpreted as incorporating many of those 
guarantees and applying them against the states. See generally Michael 
Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986). See also the comment 
by John Bingham in the course of debates over the Fourteenth 
Amendment, declaring that “[t]here was a want hitherto, and there 
remains a want now, in the Constitution of our country, which the 
proposed amendment will supply. What is that? It is the power . . . to 
protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens 
of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its 
jurisdiction.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2542 (1866). 
Additional comments along the same lines can be found in Foner, 
supra note 8, at 228–80. 
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recognize that he retained antebellum conceptions of “civil rights” and 
accompanying antebellum assumptions about federalism. His 
conclusion that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, taken together, had “one pervading purpose . . . lying 
at the foundation of each . . . the freedom of the slave race, the 
security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of 
the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those 
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him,”138 was the 
same conclusion that Bradley, Waite, and he would derive in 
Cruikshank, Reese, and federal voting rights cases. Racial animus was 
necessary to make out a Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth 
Amendment violation because the protection of African Americans lay 
behind each of those Amendments.139 
Hence the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller maintained, evolved 
out of a recognition that even after the abolition of slavery “the 
condition of the slave race” in former slave states “would, without 
further protection of the federal government, be almost as bad as it 
was before” because “[a]mong the first acts of legislation” in those 
states “were laws which . . . curtailed [the rights of freed slaves] in the 
pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their 
freedom was of little value . . . .”140 Miller particularized: 
They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in 
any other character than menial servants. They were required to 
reside on and cultivate the soil without the right to purchase or 
own it. They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and 
were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any case 
where a white man was a party. It was said that their lives were 
at the mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their 
protection were insufficient or were not enforced.141 
Further, the Fifteenth Amendment was the product of a recognition 
by “the thoughtful men who had been the authors of the other two 
amendments” that those “were inadequate for the protection of life, 
liberty, and property, without which freedom to the slave was no 
boon.”142 This was because former slaves “were in all those States 
denied the right of suffrage. The laws were administered by the white 
man alone.”143 Hence, “[t]he negro having, by the [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendment, been declared to be a citizen of the United States,” was  
138. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71. 
139.  Id. at 71–72  
140. Id. at 70. 
141. Id.  
142.  Id. at 71.  
143. Id.   
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“made a voter in every state of the Union”144 by the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 
Note that the same implicit understandings about civil rights and 
the indifference of former slave states to their exercise by African 
Americans that we have observed in Cruikshank, Reese, and the 
voting rights cases appear in Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion. 
Although pursuing a calling, owning property, or giving testimony in 
the courts were examples of antebellum “secured” or “natural” rights, 
they were rights connected with state citizenship. Once slaves were 
freed by the Thirteenth Amendment, states still had no obligation to 
treat them as citizens, and Miller’s list of practices suggested that 
many did not.145 The declaration in the Fourteenth Amendment that 
freed slaves were citizens of states was designed to deal with those 
practices. But African Americans continued to be disenfranchised in 
former slave states, which meant that their life, liberty, and property 
could still be curtailed. Hence the enactment of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which created a civil right not to have one’s ability to 
vote restricted on the basis of race.146 The Fifteenth Amendment 
could be enforced by the federal government if states declined to 
uphold the right to vote. 
Miller thus seems to have anticipated that the principal role of 
the federal government as an enforcer of violations of civil rights in 
the states would come in the area of voting rights. Outside that area, 
it was necessary to show that a state actor had deprived a citizen of a 
civil right, either by intentional conduct or negligent conduct (as 
where state laws were “insufficient” or “not enforced”). One 
illustration of this role was when states declined to allow African 
Americans to own property or to give testimony in court. In such 
instances, Miller anticipated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause coming into play. Indeed, he thought that to be the 
primary purpose of the Clause. “The existence of laws in the States 
where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated 
with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class,” he wrote in 
his Slaughter-House opinion, “was the evil to be remedied by this 
clause . . . .”147 So “[i]f . . . the States did not conform their laws to its 
requirements,” the federal government could intervene under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.148 
Miller’s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause in the 
Slaughter-House Cases has typically been singled out for its 
 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 70.  
146. Id. at 71.   
147.  Id. at 81.  
148. Id. 
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purportedly narrow interpretation of that clause, with emphasis on his 
comment that “[w]e doubt very much whether any action of a State 
not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, 
or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the 
purview of this provision.”149 But for present purposes the important 
feature of Miller’s discussion of the Equal Protection Clause is that he 
viewed it as a measure designed to give the federal government 
corrective power when the rights of state citizens were discriminated 
against by states on the basis of race. Under this reading, the Equal 
Protection Clause was not safeguarding the rights of national citizens, 
nor was it a basis for federal intervention in most instances where a 
state curtailed “natural” or “secured” rights. If a state, for example, 
restricted the opportunities of women or male non-freeholders to vote 
in state or local elections, that was not a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Only when a state allowed some opportunities to 
its white citizens and denied them to its black citizens could the 
Clause come into play.150 
The above reading of Miller’s view of the Equal Protection Clause 
seems consistent with two other features of his Slaughter-House 
opinion, both of which have figured prominently in the conventional 
account of the opinion as beginning a judicial retreat from the 
egalitarian vision of Reconstruction. The first feature is Miller’s 
narrow construction of the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment. The second, and 
related, feature is Miller’s claim that the Reconstruction Amendments 
were not designed “to transfer the security and protection of all . . . 
civil rights . . . from the States to the federal government,” and 
therefore “to bring within the [enforcement] power of Congress the 
entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the 
States.”151 
In the cases decided between 1874 and 1884, previously discussed, 
we have seen that Justices on the Waite Court distinguished between 
classes of what were coming to be generically called civil rights: 
“natural” or “secured” rights, “created” or “conferred” rights.152 The 
latter category was small, restricted to rights that were enacted in 
provisions of constitutional amendments, such as the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s right not to have one’s ability to vote restricted on the 
 
149. Id. 
150. Id. (“It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency that a 
strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.”).  
151. Id. at 77. In contrast, Justice Bradley thought that among the 
“privileges and immunities” included in the Fourteenth Amendment 
were those enumerated in the first eight amendments to the 
Constitution. Id. at 118–19 (Bradley, J., dissenting).  
152.  See, supra Part IV.A–C. 
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basis of race. Most of the “civil rights” described in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, and most of the “privileges and immunities” identified by 
Washington in Corfield, were “natural” or “secured” rights. That class 
of rights was associated with state, not national citizenship, and was 
subject to, as Washington put it, “such restraints as the government 
may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”153 
When one superimposes a map of federal and state power onto 
this categorization of “civil rights,” it becomes clear that one of the 
major considerations for judges interpreting the Reconstruction 
Amendments was how far those amendments had expanded the class 
of “created” or “conferred” rights by including provisions abolishing 
slavery or involuntary servitude, or alluding to the “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States,” to “due process of law,” 
to “the equal protection of the laws,” and to “the right of citizens of 
the United States to vote.” According to the Waite Court’s typology 
of “civil rights,” if any of those provisions “created” or “conferred” a 
new civil right, that right was national in character, and could be 
enforced by the federal government against states.154 
So if the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States” were going to be treated as the federal equivalent of 
Washington’s list of “privileges and immunities” enjoyed by state 
citizens, then when a state “abridged” the making of contracts, or the 
pursuit of an occupation, or access to the courts, or freedom from 
physical attack or punishment, the federal government could enforce 
those “privileges” or “immunities” against the state in question. 
Similarly, if “due process of law” meant the opportunity to pursue 
economic activity free from governmental restraints, or if “equal 
protection of the laws” meant a new federal civil right not to be 
treated unequally in the economic marketplace, those were “created” 
civil rights, as capable as being enforced against willful or negligent 
states as the right not to have one’s ability to vote restricted on the 
basis of race. 
That was why Miller resolved to make it clear that unless the 
antebellum map of civil rights federalism were retained, momentous 
consequences would follow. As he put it, 
[T]he entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the States [previously] lay within the constitutional and 
legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal 
government. Was it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, 
by the simple declaration that no State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and  
153. 6 F. Cas. at 552.  
154. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. 
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).   
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protection of all . . . civil rights . . . from the States to the 
Federal government? And where it is declared that Congress 
shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to 
bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil 
rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States? 
. . . [S]uch a construction . . . would constitute this court a 
perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil 
rights of their own citizens . . . . [T]he effect is to fetter and 
degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the 
control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore 
universally conceded to them . . . it radically changes the whole 
theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to 
each other . . . .155 
Thus, a minimalist interpretation of the “privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States” was necessary, Miller believed, to 
prevent the derivation and enforcement of “civil rights” from 
becoming the exclusive province of the federal courts and the federal 
government. He also advanced a minimalist interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, dismissing the claim 
that the Louisiana statute deprived the butchers of their property by 
restraining their trade as supported by “no construction of that 
provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem 
admissible . . . .”156 
That left the Equal Protection Clause. If one recalls the allusions 
to “state neglect” that surfaced in Waite Court decisions after the 
Slaughter-House Cases, it is possible that Miller thought of the Equal 
Protection Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
giving the federal courts or Congress power to step in when states 
declined to enforce the “secured” civil rights of their African 
American citizens, such as by denying them the opportunity to hold 
property or sue in court. 
Two passages in Miller’s Slaughter-House opinion seem consistent 
with that interpretation. In one, he noted that “[i]f . . .  States did 
not conform their laws to [the] requirements [of the Equal Protection 
Clause], then by the fifth section of the article of amendment 
Congress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation.”157 In the 
other, speaking of the racial thrust of the Equal Protection Clause, he 
said, “[W]e may safely leave that matter until . . . some case of State 
oppression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed 
a decision at our hands.”158 The passages suggest that in instances in  
155. 83 U.S. at 77–78. 
156. Id. at 81. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
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which states declined to afford black citizens the same “natural” or 
“secured” rights they afforded to white citizens, the Equal Protection 
Clause could serve as a mandate for federal intervention.159 
In short, the Slaughter-House Cases seem consistent with the 
subsequent circuit court and Supreme Court decisions previously 
discussed with regard to three issues: the uncertain, limited status of 
federal “civil rights” after the Reconstruction Amendments; the 
enduring power of the antebellum map of federal and state powers, 
with its emphasis on the primacy of states in defining and limiting the 
civil rights of their citizens; but at the same time a growing awareness 
by Justices on the Waite Court that Southern states were 
systematically denying African Americans opportunities to exercise 
their secured rights, and a corresponding awareness that the federal 
government could step in, under provisions of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, to enforce those opportunities.160 
2. The Civil Rights Cases 
In the conventional historiography of Reconstruction, the Civil 
Rights Cases are treated as perhaps the strongest evidence that the 
Waite Court had abandoned black freedmen to the white 
supremacists that had reemerged in Southern legislatures.161 The cases 
 
159. That reading of the passages is consistent with Miller’s belief, expressed 
in correspondence with his brother-in-law William Pitt Ballinger, a 
resident of Texas, that Southern states were not enforcing laws 
protecting the secured rights of their citizens when the parties seeking 
protection under the laws were African American. “Show me a single 
white man,” Miller wrote Ballinger, “that has been punished in a State 
court for murdering a negro . . . . Show me that any public meeting has 
been had to express indignation at such conduct. Show me that you or 
any of the best men of the South have gone ten steps to prevent the 
recurrence of such things.” Letter from Justice Samuel Miller to William 
Pitt Ballinger (Feb. 6, 1867) (quoted in Ross, supra note 135, at 147). 
160. There were vigorous dissents in the Slaughter-House Cases by Justices 
Field, Bradley, and Swayne, with Chase concurring in Field’s dissent. 83 
U.S. at 83–129. But the areas of disagreement between Miller and the 
dissenting justices centered on their interpretations of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and Due Process Clause, both of which, in the view 
of the dissenters, provided support for protection of the right to pursue 
a lawful calling (butchery) without interference by a state. None of the 
dissenting opinions openly disagreed with Miller’s concern about the 
federal government and the federal courts becoming “perpetual censors” 
on the states, or all “civil rights” becoming national rights, nor did any 
of them reject his claim that the federal government could intervene 
under the Equal Protection Clause when states declined to afford black 
citizens their “secured” civil rights. Id. 
161. See, e.g., C. Peter Magrath, Morrison R. Waite: The Triumph 
of Character 132–34 (1963); Equal Justice Under Law, supra 
note 104, at 497–500. 
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invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875.162 That legislation was 
initially designed to prevent states, and in one instance private 
enterprises, from discriminating on the basis of race in public schools; 
the selection of juries; and public accommodations, which included 
inns, forms of public transportation; and places of public amusement, 
such as theaters and concerts.163 Although the public accommodations 
provision extended to enterprises operated by private individuals, 
such enterprises were taken to be open to members of the public 
generally, so the line between state and private action did not seem 
significant. By the time the Act was passed by a lame-duck session of 
Congress in early 1875, the public schools provision had been 
dropped.164 The other two provisions were immediately challenged on 
constitutional grounds. 
Securing broad protection against racial discrimination in public 
accommodations had been part of the agenda of some Republicans in 
Congress since the conclusion of the Civil War. Initially, legislation 
providing such protection was thought to rest on the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but after the 
Slaughter-House majority opinion’s limited reading of that clause, 
such a rationale appeared problematic.165 Attention then turned to 
two other sources of protection: the Thirteenth Amendment166 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.167 The first basis 
had the advantage of being applicable to private individuals as well as 
states, but it required that equal access to public accommodations for 
blacks be thought of as a way of preventing the perpetuation of the 
“badges and incidents of slavery.” The second basis was consistent 
with a view of the Equal Protection Clause as directed at state-
sanctioned racial discrimination, but it required that private activity  
in the public accommodations area be regarded as state activity.168 
In the Civil Rights Cases, Bradley’s majority opinion would seize 
upon both of those difficulties. But his opinion was very likely 
affected by another concern about racial discrimination in public 
accommodations. In the course of an 1876 correspondence with Justice 
William Woods about whether the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was 
constitutional, Bradley wrote a memorandum with some thoughts on 
“Civil Rights.” They included the following:  
162. 109 U.S. at 26. 
163.  See Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 88. 
164. Id. at 89. 
165. Id. at 90. 
166. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 728 (1872) (remarks of Senator 
Sumner). 
167. See Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 90. 
168.  Id. at 89.  
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Surely Congress cannot guaranty to the colored people 
admission to every place of gathering and amusement. To 
deprive white people of the right of choosing their own company 
would be to introduce another kind of slavery. . . . Surely a 
white lady cannot be enforced by Congressional enactment to 
admit colored persons to her ball or assembly or dinner party. 
. . .  
     It never can be endured that the white shall be compelled to 
lodge and eat and sit with the negro. . . . The antipathy of race 
cannot be crushed and annihilated by legal enactment. . . . 
     The 13th Amendment declares that slavery and involuntary 
servitude shall be abolished, and that Congress may enforce the 
enfranchisement of the slaves. Granted: but does freedom of the 
blacks require the slavery of the whites? [A]nd enforced 
fellowship would be that.  
     The 14th amendment declares that no state shall make or 
enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States. True. But is it a 
privilege and immunity of a colored citizen to sit and ride by 
the side of white persons?  
     It declares that no person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws. But are they denied that protection 
when they are required to eat and sit and ride by themselves, 
and not with whites. . . . [S]urely it is no deprivation of civil 
right to give each race the right to choose their own company.169 
It is clear from these comments that Bradley believed that the right 
to choose one’s own company was what had come to be called a 
“social” right rather than a civil right. That distinction appeared in a 
passage in his Civil Rights Cases opinion, in which, referring to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, he said that “Congress did not assume . . . 
to adjust . . .  the social rights of men and races in the community; 
but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which 
appertain to the essence of citizenship . . . .”170 That comment, and 
 
169. The memorandum from the Joseph Bradley Papers is quoted in 
Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Renuion, 1864–1888: Part 
Two 564 (1987). 
170. 109 U.S. 1, 22 (1883). Rutherglen demonstrates that the distinction 
between civil and social rights was present in the debates over both the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875. See 
Rutherglen, supra note 29, at 52, 89. Brandwein has argued that the 
distinction was central in the latter set of debates and that it was 
understood as having different federalism implications by Bradley and 
Justice John Marshall Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases. See Brandwein, 
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other passages in Bradley’s opinion, such as “[i]t would be running the 
slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of 
discrimination which a person may see fit as to make as to the guests 
he will entertain,”171 and “[w]hen a man has emerged from slavery, 
and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the 
inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in 
the process of his elevation when he . . . ceases to be the special 
favorite of the laws,”172 have contributed to the conventional view of 
the decision as an effort on part of the Waite Court to facilitate a 
retreat from the egalitarian ideals of Reconstruction. 
But, as noted, the distinction between civil rights and social 
rights  had appeared in debates over the passage of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875: Bradley’s assumption 
that an individual’s choice to discriminate with respect to the 
entertainment of guests implicated “social” rather than “civil” rights 
was neither novel nor exceptional. 
Justice John Marshall Harlan, dissenting in the Civil Rights 
Cases, acknowledged the existence of the civil rights and social rights 
distinction. “I agree,” Harlan wrote, “that government has nothing to 
do with social, as distinguished from technically legal, rights of 
individuals. . . . I agree that if one citizen chooses not to hold social 
intercourse with another, he is not and cannot be made amenable to 
the law for his conduct in that regard; for even upon grounds of race,” 
Harlan conceded, “no legal right of a citizen is violated by the refusal 
of others to maintain social relations with him.”173 But the rights 
being secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were in Harlan’s view 
“legal, not social rights.”174 He maintained that the right of black 
citizens to have access to public accommodations on the same terms 
as white citizens was “no more a social right than . . . [their] right to 
sit in a public building with others, of whatever race, for the purpose 
of hearing the public questions of the day discussed.”175 
Bradley and Harlan’s contemporaries thus agreed that the 
category of “civil rights”—protected legal rights of citizens—did not 
include “social” rights. Their position on the protected status of a 
right to equal access to public accommodations differed, however. 
Bradley analogized equal access to public accommodations to equal 
 
The Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?, supra note 9, at 352–57; 
Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 78–86, 
163–64, 170–73. 
171. 109 U.S. at 24. 
172. Id. at 25. 
173.  Id. at 59.  
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 59–60. 
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access to a dinner party or a ball. Enforced access for blacks would 
submit whites to “another form of slavery”; each race had the right to 
“choose its own company.”176 Harlan analogized the public 
accommodations provisions of the 1875 Act to the right of a colored 
citizen to use the accommodations of a public highway on the same 
terms as are permitted to white citizens.177 
But the social rights/civil rights distinction, or, for that matter, 
Bradley’s observation that “[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is 
not the subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment,”178 did not 
figure prominently in his analysis of the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875. That Act was constitutionally defective, Bradley 
concluded, because it exceeded the mandates of both the Fourteenth 
and Thirteenth Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment, he 
maintained, was predicated on the principle that: 
where a subject is not submitted to the general legislative power 
of Congress, but is only submitted thereto for the purpose of 
rendering effective some prohibition against particular State 
legislation or State action in reference to that subject, the power 
given is limited by its object, and any legislation by Congress in 
the matter must necessarily be corrective in its character, 
adapted to counteract and redress the operation of such 
prohibited State laws or proceedings of State officers.179 
The provision of the Fourteenth Amendment giving Congress the 
power to enforce its other provisions “by appropriate legislation” thus 
meant that the enforcement power would be limited by the scope of 
those provisions.180 All the restrictive provisions of the Amendment—
its privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection 
clauses—were restrictions on states or their officials. The enforcement 
provision of the Amendment could only come into play as a “mode[] 
of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State 
officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the 
fundamental rights specified in the amendment.”181 
Although Bradley clearly felt that access to public 
accommodations was a social rather than a civil right, his opinion in 
the Civil Rights Cases formally took no position on that issue. He 
stated that although the Court had assumed “that a right to enjoy 
equal accommodation and privileges in all inns, public conveyances,  
176. Id. at 25. 
177. Id. at 59. 
178. Id. at 11. 
179. Id. at 18. 
180. Id. at 11.  
181. Id. 
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and places of public amusement, is one of the essential rights of the 
citizen,” it was not necessary to resolve that issue because the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875 far exceeded the enforcement power of the federal 
government under the Fourteenth Amendment.182 It not only was 
directed at individuals rather than states or state actors, it was 
“primary and direct,” not “corrective” legislation. As Bradley put it, 
The law in question, without any reference to adverse State 
legislation on the subject, declares that all persons shall be 
entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of inns, public 
conveyances, and places of public amusement, and imposes a 
penalty upon any individual who shall deny to any citizen such 
accommodations and privileges. This is not corrective 
legislation; it is primary and direct . . . .  It supersedes and 
displaces State legislation on the same subject . . . . It . . . 
assumes that the matter is one that belongs to the domain of 
national regulation.183 
The theory of federalism animating Bradley’s analysis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the Civil Rights Cases was thus similar to 
that animating Miller’s Slaughter-House Cases opinion. In both the 
Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases, Court majorities treated the 
enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment as extending 
only as far as the explicit coverage of that Amendment. Because the 
prohibitions of the Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal 
Protection Clauses were against “state” action, federal enforcement 
could only take place against states or state officials. Otherwise the 
federal government, and the federal courts, would be a “perpetual 
censor” on the activities of the states;184 otherwise Congress could 
“legislate on subjects which are within the domain of State 
legislation”;185 otherwise Congress could “create a code of municipal 
law for the regulation of private rights”;186 otherwise Congress could 
“take the place of the State legislatures and . . . supersede them.”187  
In short, allowing Congress to legislate generally on the rights of 
life, liberty, and property because states were known to be capable of 
depriving persons of those rights without due process of law assumed 
that every time states were forbidden from legislating on a subject, 
Congress had a general power to legislate on it. That assumption, 
 
182. Id. at 19. 
183. Id. at 18–19. 
184. Id. at 12–15. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 11. 
187. Id. at 13. 
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Bradley declared in the Civil Rights Cases, was “certainly 
unsound.”188 
There was, however, the possibility that the Thirteenth 
Amendment provided support for the Civil Rights Act of 1875. That 
amendment did not merely prevent states from establishing or 
maintaining slavery; it declared that slavery should not exist in the 
United States and gave Congress power to enforce that declaration. If 
one employed Bradley’s terminology in the Civil Rights Cases, the 
amendment anticipated that federal legislation enforcing the abolition 
of slavery could be “primary and direct in its character.”189 As 
Bradley put it, Congress “has a right to enact all necessary and 
proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its 
badges and incidents . . . .”190 
Thinking of the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases 
primarily as federalism cases, making use of language designed to 
reveal when federal enforcement powers under the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the Reconstruction Amendments could, or could not, be 
invoked to correct state or private violations of civil rights, places the 
previously quoted passages about “running the slavery argument into 
the ground,” and African Americans being “the special favorite of the 
laws” in a different light. They can be seen as rhetorical efforts to 
counter the argument that denying black persons access to public 
accommodations was a form of slavery, and thus correctable by the 
federal government under the Thirteenth Amendment.191 Bradley 
conceded that under the enforcement provision of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, Congress could pass laws that were “direct and 
primary,” and could “operat[e] upon the acts of individuals” as well as 
those of states.192 So the question was whether “the refusal to any 
persons of the accommodations of an inn or a public conveyance or a 
place of public amusement by an individual” amounted to a “badge or 
incident of slavery.” In Bradley’s view that question answered itself; 
such an act of refusal had “nothing to do with slavery or involuntary 
servitude.”193 
 
188. Id. at 15. 
189. Id. at 20. 
190. Id. at 21. 
191. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 173–78, 
adds another issue to which Bradley’s rhetoric might have been directed: 
the idea that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 might have been thought of 
as “special legislation,” singling out African Americans for protection 
against discrimination in public accommodations where Jews and Irish 
were not comparably protected.  
192. 109 U.S. at 23.  
193. Id. at 24.  
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Moreover, Bradley noted, “[t]here were thousands of free colored 
people in this country before the abolition of slavery, . . . yet no one, 
at that time, thought that it was any invasion of [their] personal 
status as [freemen] because . . . [they were] subjected to 
discriminations in the . . . amusement. Mere discriminations on 
account of race and color were not regarded as badges of slavery.”194 It 
may be the case that after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment 
“the enjoyment of equal rights in all these respects [had] become 
established.”195 But if that were so, it was necessary for a state to 
deny such rights or neglect to enforce them before corrective federal 
legislation could come into play. 
E. Implications 
To summarize, two issues figured prominently in the 
constitutional history of civil rights after the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. The first issue was the content and the scope of 
the category of “civil rights.” The other was the effect of the 1866 Act 
and the Reconstruction Amendments on the antebellum relationship 
between the federal government and the states. By the 1880s, a 
consensus on those issues had been forged by the Supreme Court of 
the United States. That consensus has not been described accurately 
by conventional accounts of the constitutional history of the 
Reconstruction years. 
In recovering the context in which the category of civil rights 
originated in American constitutional history, it is essential to 
understand that the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were 
simultaneously committed to ensuring that newly freed African 
Americans were accorded the same civil rights as white persons and to 
preserving the antebellum balance of state and federal powers. They 
employed three devices in the Act to accomplish those goals: making 
“all (non-alien) persons born in the United States” citizens of the 
United States; affording all U.S. citizens an enumerated list of civil 
rights; and stating that “all persons” were to have the same such 
rights accorded white citizens.196 The rights listed, however, were ones 
that had been traditionally reserved for citizens of states and were 
thus held against state governments.  
Understood in that fashion, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 created 
no new civil rights for newly designated “citizens of the United 
States” that had not already been held by citizens of states, with the 
exception of free African Americans. By being citizens of the United 
States, free African Americans had the same civil rights as  
white citizens.   
194. Id. at 25. 
195. Id. 
196. § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
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The enforcement sections of the Act demonstrated its ambiguous 
relationship to antebellum models of federalism. Although the civil 
rights listed in the Act were rights traditionally held against state 
governments, Congress was given power to enforce the Act by 
“appropriate” legislation, and the federal courts were given power to 
uphold its provisions. The wording of Section 1 of the Act suggested 
that its enforcement by agencies of the federal government would 
likely take place when a state declined to afford free blacks the same 
civil rights it afforded its white citizens.197 This raised the question of 
whether the Act was designed to transform the balance between state 
and federal powers; that question, we have seen, was debated in 
Congress when it passed the Act. 
Uncertainties about the effect of the goal of protecting the civil 
rights of newly freed African Americans on the antebellum alignment 
of state and federal powers also marked, we have seen, the debates 
over the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. It was 
clear that those Amendments were designed to protect the civil rights 
of African Americans as well, but were they designed to protect other 
newly created federal civil rights? That was the central issue for the 
courts who began their interpretations of the Amendments in  
the 1870s.  
The work of the scholars previously cited, particularly that of 
Brandwein on voting rights cases, has demonstrated that a judicial 
consensus eventually emerged on how to resolve the above ambiguities 
involving civil rights and federalism.198 The best way to see that 
consensus in place is to read Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights 
Cases against the backdrop of the cases, beginning with the Slaughter-
House Cases that have been previously discussed.  
With respect to what was included and excluded in the category 
of “civil rights,” one should first look to the terminology employed by 
antebellum courts to characterize those rights, making use of 
designations such as “natural,” “secured,” “guaranteed,” “created,” 
and “conferred” rights. As courts began to work out the judicial 
enforcement of rights after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
and the Reconstruction Amendments, it became clear that they were 
treating different categories of rights as triggering different 
institutional enforcement responses. Rights “created” by the 
Reconstruction Amendments, such as the right not to have one’s 
opportunity to vote restricted on the basis of race, could be enforced 
by the federal government. In contrast, “secured” or “guaranteed” 
rights, which had their origins in the “natural law” foundations of 
common law, were rights held against states.199 Congress or federal  
197. Id.  
198. See supra Part III.C. 
199. Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 15. 
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courts could only enforce those rights if states had willfully or 
negligently failed to uphold them. 
Thus the antebellum terminology of rights, as retained and 
modified by post–Civil War enactments, served as the working 
framework for both the inclusion and exclusion of those rights 
associated with civil rights and the federalism issues. And Bradley’s 
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases revealed that at the center of that 
framework was an interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.200 
Early in his opinion, Bradley had used the Civil Rights Act to 
highlight his distinction between federal enforcement legislation that 
was “corrective” in character and the “direct and primary” legislation 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.201 After identifying the rights 
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Bradley noted that they 
were rights “for which the States alone were or could be 
responsible.”202 That is, the “secured” or “guaranteed” rights 
identified as “civil rights” by the 1866 Act were rights held against 
the states, and as such were to be enforced by state authorities. 
Efforts on the part of individuals to infringe upon those rights did not 
“destroy or injure” the rights because they could be “vindicated by 
resort to the laws of the State for redress.”203 That was what Bradley 
meant in saying that “civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the 
Constitution against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the 
wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the 
shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.”204 He 
noted that when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 enacted penalties 
against individuals for violating the civil rights it enumerated, it had 
included language making clear that individual violations needed to 
be “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or 
custom.”205 
Bradley’s primary purpose in associating individual violations of 
the rights enumerated in the 1866 Act with state law or custom was 
to demonstrate that, unlike its 1875 counterpart, the 1866 Act was 
limiting federal enforcement powers to those supporting “corrective” 
legislation.206 But it is possible to understand his interpretation of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 in another way. 
 
200. Brandwein, Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?, supra note 9, at 352–57, 
and Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 161–
67, recognize this point. 
201. 109 U.S. at 20.  
202. Id. at 18.  
203. Id. at 17. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 16.  
206. Id.  
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Elsewhere in his opinion, Bradley had indicated that the 
constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the 
Fourteenth Amendment, whose Privileges or Immunities and Equal 
Protection Clauses prohibited states from treating black and white 
citizens differently in the exercise of their civil rights.207 The 
constitutionality of the 1866 Act was thus taken for granted by 
Bradley, but he understood Congress’s power to enforce the civil 
rights it enumerated as being predicated on their being violated under 
the authority of a state. Where individuals deprived black citizens of 
the fundamental rights they now shared with white citizens and 
states, under color or law or custom, failed to correct those 
deprivations, Congress could use its enforcement powers.208 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 acted as both a floor and a ceiling 
for the content and scope of “civil rights.” The only rights that states 
were bound to enforce were those now associated, after the passage of 
the Reconstruction Amendments, with state citizenship. And when 
states failed to enforce those rights, corrective federal legislation could 
ensue. It was not necessary that state officials or policies are the 
source of deprivations of the civil rights of blacks; state officials or 
policies could also fail to punish individual violations of civil rights of 
blacks and trigger enforcement. But “civil rights” meant only the 
“fundamental rights” identified by Bradley as listed in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. 
We are now in a position to understand more clearly what 
Bradley meant in saying that “civil rights, such as are guaranteed by 
the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the 
wrongful acts of individuals . . . .”209 He meant that only when state 
authorities failed to vindicate such rights from infringement, or to 
punish those who infringed them, would the enforcement provisions of 
the 1866 Act or the Fourteenth Amendment come into play. We are 
also in a position to understand more clearly what he meant when, in 
the course of discussing the Thirteenth Amendment as one of the 
bases for the 1866 Act, he said that “Congress did not assume, under 
the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what 
may be called the social rights of men and races in the community, 
but only to declare those fundamental rights which appertain to the 
essence of citizenship . . . .”210 He looked to the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 as an authoritative source of fundamental rights, but also as an 
indication of what rights were not “fundamental.”  
207. Id. at 21–25. 
208. Brandwein, Judicial Abandonment of Blacks?, supra note 9, at 352–57, 
and Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 162–
65, read Bradley’s opinion in the same fashion.  
209. 109 U.S. at 17. 
210. Id. at 22. 
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This prepared Bradley for his conclusion in the Civil Rights Cases 
that access to inns, public conveyances, and places of public 
amusement was a “social” rather than a civil right. In his view, the 
framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 could not have regarded equal 
access to public accommodations as a “fundamental right” of 
citizenship.211 That Act was the ceiling as well as the floor of 
Reconstruction-era civil rights.212 
Conclusion: A Revised Narrative of the 
Origins of Civil Rights 
Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights Cases represents a snapshot 
of the legal status of civil rights in America approximately twenty 
years after the end of the Civil War.213 It also represents a snapshot of 
the predominant view of the relationship of the federal government 
and the states in the area of civil rights. Here, again, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 served as a template. 
I began this analysis by suggesting that recent scholarship has 
shown that the conventional history of the Supreme Court’s role in 
interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments in civil rights cases 
needs refinement. Drawing on that scholarship, I am claiming that the 
two most “notorious” decisions featured in that conventional history, 
the Slaughter-House and Civil Rights Cases, need to be read in 
connection with other civil rights decisions of the Court and its 
Justices between 1871 and 1883. From those decisions, the following 
 
211. Id. 
212. It is worth noting here how this understanding of equal access to public 
accommodations as a “social right” rather than a fundamental civil 
right, and of the practice of denying free persons of color equal access to 
public accommodations in the antebellum period, might have served to 
validate the practice of racial segregation on railroad cars that the 
Court upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). One might 
recall Bradley’s 1876 memorandum, in which, after reciting the Privilege 
or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, asked, “[I]s it a privilege and immunity of a colored citizen 
to ride and sit by the side of white persons?” and “[A]re [blacks] denied 
[the equal protection of the laws] when they are required to ride and sit 
and eat by themselves, and not with whites?” See supra note 169 and 
accompanying text. Elsewhere in the memorandum, Bradley had said 
that “it never can be endured that the white shall be compelled to eat 
and lodge and sit with the negro . . . . The antipathy of race cannot be 
crushed and annihilated by legal enactment.” Id.  Brandwein, however, 
takes the view that the doctrinal connections between the Civil Rights 
Cases and Plessy were tenuous, and required some additional steps on 
the part of the Court. See Brandwein, Rethinking Reconstruction, 
supra note 9, 187–88. 
213.  109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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jurisprudential consensus affecting the role of the states and the 
federal government in “civil rights” cases can be extracted. 
Most civil rights were creatures of state law. Whether the sources 
of those rights were natural law, antebellum common law, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, or judicial efforts to identify “fundamental rights” 
associated with citizenship, the consensus was that articulated by 
Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases: the civil rights of individuals were, 
on the whole, to be enforced by state courts, unless it could be shown 
that states had willfully or negligently failed to protect those rights. 
There was, however, a category of civil rights that had been “created” 
or “conferred” by provisions of the Constitution, such as the Fifteenth 
Amendment right not to have one’s opportunity to vote restricted on 
the basis of race or color. Created rights, like the right not to have 
one’s ability to vote restricted on racial lines, could be enforced by 
Congress and the federal courts, and did not require state action. 
The majority in the Civil Rights Cases rebuffed Harlan’s view 
that equal access to public accommodations was a civil right rather 
than a social right.214 But that did not mean that the majority took 
those “fundamental” civil rights enjoyed by black as well as white 
citizens to be wholly at the sufferance of states and state officials. The 
disinclination of the Court in the Civil Rights Cases to compel equal 
access to public accommodations left the rest of its post–Civil War 
jurisprudence intact, which meant that whenever one of the 
“fundamental” civil rights accorded to citizens was not enforced, 
whether willfully, carelessly, or inadvertently by a state court, 
“corrective” federal legislation under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendment could enforce the right, and whenever an individual or a 
state interfered with the exercise of voting on the basis of race or 
color, “direct and primary” federal legislation could ensue.215 
The Court’s post–Civil War jurisprudence of civil rights was thus 
designed to preserve, in large measure, the antebellum balance of 
federal and state powers so as to prevent the federal government from 
becoming a “perpetual censor” of the activities of states. At the same 
time, the Court’s jurisprudence was designed to create a space for 
“primary and corrective” federal legislation to guarantee the 
enforcement of two sorts of civil rights violations: the willful or 
negligent failure of states to enforce the “secured” civil rights 
enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the failure of state or 
private actors to guarantee civil rights “created” or “conferred” by the 
Constitution. Because the latter category of civil rights was 
comparatively small, and because some “under color of state law” 
requirement was necessary to trigger federal enforcement of the 
former category, the Court’s Justices believed that an appropriate 
 
214. Id. at 59.  
215.  See supra Part III.C.2.  
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balance between state and federal powers would remain after the 
Reconstruction enactments. 
Two decades after the conclusion of the Civil War, the state of 
civil rights in America was in a distinctive place. In one respect, the 
concept of “civil rights” had evolved dramatically from its virtually 
nonexistent status in antebellum jurisprudence. “Rights” had been 
associated with state citizenship, which had been extended to 
virtually all native-born residents of a state and had been equated 
with national citizenship. 216 A list of civil rights had been enumerated 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and been characterized as 
“fundamental” in Supreme Court decisions.217 Those rights had 
explicitly been afforded to black as well as white persons. In contrast 
to the antebellum jurisprudence of rights, in which states could define 
citizenship in a fashion that excluded numerous categories of persons 
from that status and could limit the rights of non-citizens with 
impunity, this was a substantial change. Not only had “civil rights” 
become an established and meaningful legal category, but also nearly 
all Americans were regarded as possessing civil rights. 
In another respect, the jurisprudential status of civil rights in the 
1880s reflected the origins of that category in the antebellum legacies 
of slavery, racial discrimination, and the autonomy of the states.218 
Although the language of some provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been expansive, speaking of “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States,” “due process of law,” and 
the “equal protection of the laws,” court decisions had interpreted the 
Amendment’s primary purpose as elevating blacks out of slavery by 
preventing states from subjecting them to discriminatory treatment. 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause was read narrowly, the Due 
Process Clause was deemed not to cover economic “liberties,” and the 
Equal Protection Clause was read as a corrective standard for the acts 
of state and state officials, not as the source of a new national right to 
be free from discrimination of a variety of sources. 
Each time a Reconstruction-era Congressional statute or 
constitutional amendment raised the possibility of the federal 
government’s exercising vigorous oversight of discriminatory state 
customs or laws, courts rejected the notion. The enforcement 
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was treated as applicable 
only to racially discriminatory actions engaged in, or tolerated by, 
 
216. “Indians not taxed,” which included most members of Native American 
tribes living on reservations, were not regarded as citizens of the United 
States until 1924 and were not allowed to vote in several states as late 
as the 1970s. See Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: 
Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution 164–81 (2009).  
217. 109 U.S. at 22.  
218. See supra Part I.  
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state officials. The Fourteenth Amendment’s provisions were treated 
in a comparable fashion. Only the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
enforcement provision pertaining to voting rights was made applicable 
to individuals as well as state actors. “Direct and primary” legislation 
allowing the federal government to enforce civil rights without a 
predicate of state neglect, such as that anticipated in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, was invalidated. 
Perhaps most ominously, the category of “fundamental” civil 
rights only expanded in one respect after the passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. Voting rights, conceived of as rights not to have 
voting opportunities restricted on the basis of race or color, were 
thought of as “fundamental” rights, and because they had been 
conferred, they could be enforced without a state action predicate.219 
Otherwise, the list of “fundamental” rights associated with citizenship 
looked about the same in 1883 as it had when Washington sought to 
enumerate “privileges and immunities” in 1823.220 Moreover, the 
category of “social rights” had emerged as an implicit limitation on 
the category of civil rights. To say that someone had a “social right” 
to do something was the equivalent of saying that the action had no 
legal protection. 
The “social rights” category threatened to become more robust as 
the focus of racial discrimination moved, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, from explicit efforts on the part of states to 
afford blacks fewer opportunities than whites to efforts on the part of 
states and private individuals to prevent blacks and whites from 
contact in public places. As inns, public conveyances, other public 
facilities such as schools, hospitals, and “places of public amusement” 
recognized that they could not entirely bar groups of persons from 
access, they, along with state legislatures, began to segregate their 
black and white patrons. 
Racial segregation can be thought of as a response to several of 
the concerns Bradley raised in his 1876 memorandum on civil rights.221 
It reinforced the idea that in social settings people could choose with 
whom they associated, exercising what amounted to a “natural” right 
of association, which Bradley felt could not be overcome by law. It 
also reinforced what Bradley called “racial antipathy”—the belief that 
most whites would not want blacks to “eat, sit, or lodge” with them. 
Finally, it introduced the rationale of “separate but equal.” As 
 
219. See § 1, 14 Stat. 27; 109 U.S. at 17–18.  
220.  Compare Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) with Corfield v. Coryell, 
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
221.  The memorandum from the Joseph Bradley Papers is quoted in 
Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864–1888: 
Part Two 564 (1987). 
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Bradley noted, if blacks were required to eat or sit or ride with other 
blacks, that was just a choice to be in the society of their own kind.222 
But it is a mistake to allow the expansion of the social rights 
category in segregation statutes and court decisions from the 1890s 
through the 1920s to overwhelm the civil rights jurisprudence of the 
1870s and 1880s. Those decades are best seen not as preparation for 
the world of Jim Crow, but as a period in which antebellum 
conceptions of rights and federalism awkwardly coexisted with 
impulses to define and to protect the legal rights of African 
Americans emerging from slavery into an uncertain future. 
In retrospect, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, not the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments, was the talismanic post-
Reconstruction civil rights document. It was in some respects a replay 
of lingering antebellum issues. Its focus was primarily on buttressing 
the rights of former slaves by protecting them from further 
discrimination. Its list of protected “fundamental” rights was drawn 
from antebellum jurisprudence. Courts interpreted its potential to 
transform state law through its enforcement provisions as minimal, 
and thus its enactment had little effect on the antebellum map of 
federal and state relations. But at the same time, it did something 
monumental.  
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 transformed the indeterminate 
antebellum status of “rights” in America into a legal category whose 
application was as broad as the new legal category of citizen, which 
after the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the vast majority of 
persons residing in the United States. No longer could states limit the 
rights of their residents simply by declining to treat them as citizens. 
Moreover, persons of “every race and color,” as citizens, were entitled 
to the same rights as white citizens: no longer could states make race 
a proxy for granting or denying civil rights. It seems fair to say that 
with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 came the origins 
of civil rights in America. 
 
222. Id.  
